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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
In this thesis I investigated whether and to what extent performing a task with another 
person may change individual cognitive performance. Interference paradigms are 
particularly suitable for addressing this issue. The rationale behind the use of these 
paradigms is that most of them can be split in two complementary or independent tasks 
assigned to two different individuals. By comparing task performance when participants 
act in the joint context and when they perform the task individually, important 
information may be derived about whether the co-actor’s task is represented and how 
this representation influences one’s own performance.  
Following this approach, I adopted the joint version of two different and well-known 
paradigms: the picture-word interference paradigm (Study 1: Experiments 1, 2, 3) and 
the Simon task (Study 2: Experiments 4, 5, 6). Both paradigms allow understanding 
how people can deal with the task irrelevant information when the accomplishment of 
the task is achieved in a joint (and cooperative) context. 
The results of both studies provided converging evidence showing that, regardless of the 
paradigm used, task sharing determines the disappearance of the interference effect 
produced by the task irrelevant information (Study 1) or by the (incidental) spatial 
representation of an alternative response (Study 2). The disappearance of the 
interference effects, however, occurred only when the co-actor was thought to work on 
vi 
 
different or complementary stimuli but not when s/he was in charge of the same stimuli 
as the participant.  
These findings will be accounted for by taking into consideration both the specific 
peculiarities of each paradigm exploited and the strategic processes of division of labor 
that can be established between two co-acting individuals. 
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1 
Theoretical background 
 
Studies in cognitive psychology have long been directed to investigate human cognitive 
functions in environments in which participants act in isolation. Studies conducted in 
experimental psychology labs, indeed, do not usually admit the involvement of people 
other than the individual under investigation. The presence of other people is commonly 
considered as a source artifacts, which has to be absolutely avoided. It is worth noting, 
however, that in everyday life we rarely engage in activities that do not imply the 
presence or the involvement of other people. We are social beings and we perform 
actions in environments penetrated with social interactions. As a consequence, our 
actions are necessary influenced by the presence of other people, the kind of 
relationships we have with them and their specific actions. In the light of this fact, in the 
last decades cognitive psychology has started to take into consideration the influence of 
these variables on human cognition and actions. What has been traditionally considered 
as an artifact, in this new perspective is seen as a fundamental variable that deserves to 
be investigated.  
In this respect, two different research areas can be distinguished: social facilitation and 
joint action. The main difference between these two lines of research is that social 
facilitation area investigates how participants’ performance is influenced by the 
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presence of another person performing simultaneously and independently the same task 
as the participant (i.e., two participants performing the same task in the same room 
without co-acting, that is, independently of one another); in contrast, joint action
1
 area 
refers to actual interactive conditions in which two participants take care of two 
different (and/or complementary) aspects of the same task. In the following sections I 
summarize the main studies and the relevant results characterizing these two different 
areas of research.  
 
1.1 SOCIAL FACILITATION 
Social facilitation is one the oldest concept in social psychology (Allport, 1920; Bond & 
Titus, 1983)
2
. Social facilitation theory focuses on the changes that occur when 
individuals perform tasks alone or in presence of real, imagined or implied others: an 
audience (i.e., people in the same room where the participant is performing his/her task) 
or co-actors (i.e., persons performing independently the same task as the participant). 
Several social facilitation studies have unequivocally demonstrated that task 
performance is affected differentially by social presence. Typically, performance is 
                                                          
1
 Joint action research embraces several aspects of human interactions (see Knoblich, Butterfill, & 
Sebanz, 2011, for a review). An extensive review of all the studies and paradigms related to the joint 
action area is beyond the purposes of this thesis. As a consequence, in this chapter I focus only on the 
literature related to the joint Simon effect. 
2
 The development of social facilitation theory can be traced back to Triplett’s study (1898). Triplett 
noticed that bicycle racers were faster when they raced against other cyclists then when they raced 
alone. At first blush, Triplett attributed the improvement of performance to the competitive context and 
to the increase in the motivation that might characterized this kind of contexts. The introduction of the 
term social facilitation, however, owes to Allport (1920), who extended Triplett’s (1898) research by 
attempting to minimize the role of competition. 
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facilitated in simple tasks, whereas it is impaired in difficult tasks (Aiello & Douthitt, 
2001; Guerin, 1993). 
Over the years, different interpretations have been proposed to account for these effects.  
According to the traditional interpretation, the presence of others increases the general 
drive and the activation level of the actor (generalized drive hypothesis; Zajonc, 1965). 
In Zajonc’s view, increasing in activation is an innate reaction that would allow people 
to promptly respond to any potential unexpected actions by others. The increase in 
activation level enhances the dominant-response tendency: It facilitates dominant responses 
(i.e., those responses that have priority in one’s own behavioral repertoire) and it inhibits 
subordinate responses. In simple (or well-learned) tasks, the dominant response is the 
correct one, which leads to performance improvement. In contrast, in difficult (or not well-
learned) tasks, the dominant response is the wrong one and, as a consequence, performance 
is impaired.  
Few years later, Zajonc’s theory was brought into question by Henchy and Glass 
(1968), who argued that the presence of others is not sufficient to induce social 
facilitation. In contrast to Zajonc’s hypothesis, these authors claimed that the increase in 
individual arousal induced by social presence is not an innate response but it occurs 
only when the individuals are afraid that their performance will be evaluated (evaluation 
apprehension hypothesis; see also Cottrell, Wack, Sekerak, & Rittle, 1968 for an 
extension of this theory, the learned drive hypothesis).  
In the 80s, the role of attention was emphasized. According to the distraction-conflict 
hypothesis (Baron, Moore & Sanders, 1978) the presence of others has a distracting 
effect, thus hampering participants to completely focus their attention on the task. This 
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turns into an increase in activation, arising from a conflict between the others and the 
task, which always impairs performance on difficult tasks. Whereas performance on 
simple tasks can either improve or decrease depending on the number of distractors in 
the environment and, thus, the size of activation: the more distractors are, the worst 
performance is. 
The overload hypothesis (Baron, 1986) can be considered as a modified version of the 
distraction-conflict hypothesis, as it states that the distraction induced by the presence of 
others does not lead to an increased arousal but rather it gives rise to a cognitive 
overload. Cognitive overload, in turn, causes a restriction of the focus of the attention, 
resulting in performance facilitation when the task is simple or requires attention to a 
small numbers of elements, and in performance impairment when the task is complex or 
requires paying attention to many elements. Performance increases on simple tasks 
because cognitive overload allows participants to focus their attention on the relevant 
stimuli and to filter out irrelevant information. 
In contrast, on difficult tasks, which usually consist of several stimuli that tie up 
attention, performance decreases because participants might neglect stimuli that are 
crucial to perform the task. 
Empirical evidences in support of the attentional theories of social facilitation have been 
obtained by employing one of the best-known interference tasks in cognitive 
psychology: the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935). In the next paragraph I review relatively 
recent experimental studies supporting the attentional view of social facilitation. 
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1.1.1 Social presence influence on the Stroop effect 
The standard Stroop task requires participants to name the color of the ink with which a 
letters string is printed. Typically, RTs are slower when the string is a color name 
incongruent with its ink color (e.g., when the word green is shown in red) as compared 
to neutral trials (e.g., when a string of Xs is displayed in red), a phenomenon known as 
Stroop interference (MacLeod, 1991). The occurrence of this interference has been 
traditionally attributed to the fact that reading is automatic and that skilled readers 
cannot refrain from accessing word meaning (Besner, Stolz, & Boutilier, 1997). 
Importantly, the presence of such an effect is a clear example of interference arising 
from a conflict between an automatic (uncontrolled) cognitive process (word reading) 
and a relatively controlled cognitive process (color naming).  
The Stroop task is particularly appropriate to disentangle between the two main 
hypotheses advanced to explain social facilitation effects, that is, the generalized drive 
hypothesis (Zajonc, 1965) and the distraction-conflict hypothesis (Baron et al., 1978). 
Indeed, on the basis of these two hypotheses, opposite effects are expected when 
participants perform the Stroop task in presence of others. Specifically, following the 
generalized drive hypothesis the presence of an audience (or co-actors) should facilitate 
dominant responses – here, word reading – thus increasing the Stroop interference. 
Consistent with this prediction, past research have shown that increased arousal 
enhances the Stroop interference (Conty, Gimmig, Belletier, George, & Huguet, 2010; 
Pallack, Pittman, Heller, and Munson, 1975; Hochman, 1967). 
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In contrast, according to the distraction-conflict hypothesis, since the presence of others 
is a source of distraction, participants should narrow their attention on the relevant 
information – here, color naming – thus reducing the Stroop interference. Consistently 
with this alternative prediction, previous studies have demonstrated that distraction 
reduces the Stroop interference (Lavie, 2005; Hartley & Adams, 1974; Houston & 
Jones, 1967). 
The results of several studies using the social Stroop task have provided converging 
evidence in favor of the distraction-conflict hypothesis (Muller & Butera, 2007; Dumas, 
Huguet & Ayme, 2005; Huguet, Dumas, & Monteil, 2004; Muller, Atzeni, & Butera, 
2004; Huguet, Galvaing, Monteil, & Dumas, 1999; MacKinnon, Geiselman, and 
Woodward, 1985). For example, in the study of Huguet et al. (1999), participants were 
required to execute a manual version of the Stroop task first alone and then in presence 
of a confederate. The presence of the confederate was motivated as due to technical 
problems in another room wherein a different experiment was taking place. In line with 
the distraction-conflict hypothesis, results showed that the Stroop interference was 
significantly reduced when participants performed the task in presence of an audience, 
compared to when they executed the task in isolation. The same pattern of results was 
observed in a second experiment aimed at investigating social facilitation effects in a 
co-action context implying social comparison. After completing the Stroop task alone, 
participants performed the task in the presence of a same-sex confederate who worked 
simultaneously on the identical task. Participants were forced to compare their 
performance with that of the confederate who, depending on the experimental condition, 
was either similar (lateral social comparison), slower (downward social comparison), or 
7 
 
faster (upward social comparison) than the participant. The authors observed a 
significant reduction of the Stroop interference in the conditions in which participants 
faced with a similar or a faster responding co-actor, compared to the conditions in 
which participants performed the task either alone or in presence of a slower co-actor. 
On the basis of these results, Huguet et al. concluded that the attentional focus on the 
relevant information (i.e., the ink color) is not simply due to the fact that social presence 
induces distraction, but it also results from the participants' willingness to actively 
inhibit word reading when the co-actor is a relevant target of comparison, that is, when 
they faced with an actual (in the case of upwards social comparison) or potentially (in 
the case of lateral social comparison; i.e., mere co-action) self-threatening co-actor (see 
Muller & Bureta, 2007, and Muller, Atzeni, and Butera, 2004 for similar results and 
conclusions using a different paradigm). In contrast, when participants’ performance is 
better than that of the co-actor (in the case of downward social comparison), comparison 
is not relevant and, thus, it is not distracting
3
 just because participants are not threatened 
in their self-evaluation. This interpretation would also explain why co-action effects are 
not observed when the co-actor works on a different task (Sanders, Baron, & Moore, 
1978). In this case, indeed, the co-actor’s performance does not represent a self-
evaluation threat given that the risk of being inferior to him/her can be easily justified 
by the fact that s/he is performing a different task.  
                                                          
3
 A similar interpretation was proposed by Muller & Bureta (2007) and Muller et al. (2004) who 
demonstrated that self-evaluation threat increases attentional focusing, thus reducing the number of 
illusory conjunctions in a visual search task. 
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In a follow-up study, Huguet et al. (2004) provided further evidence that social 
comparison plays a crucial role in reducing the size of the Stroop interference. 
Moreover, they demonstrated that attentional control under social comparison is 
effective when it is unconscious (i.e., when participants competed against the co-actor), 
whereas this control is ineffective when it is conscious (i.e., when participants 
performed the task in the perspective of a desired reward). Furthermore, a later study 
showed that self-evaluation threat is sufficient to reduce the Stroop interference even 
when the co-actor is not physically present or when participants are required to compare 
their performance with that of a mentally represented peer group (Dumas et al., 2005; 
see also Muller & Butera, 2007 for similar results using a different paradigm)
4
.  
Recently, Sharma, Booth, Brown and Huguet (2010) provided strong evidence that 
social facilitation is caused by distractor inhibition (i.e., word reading inhibition). In 
contrast with the traditional distraction-conflict hypothesis (Baron et al., 1978), which 
assumes that social presence reduces the likelihood of processing distractors (“early 
selection” account), these authors demonstrated that distractors are normally processed, 
and then strongly inhibited before selecting the correct response (“late selection” 
account). Sharma et al. implemented an experimental design similar to that employed 
by Huguet et al. (1999, Experiment 1): Participants performed the manual version of the 
Stroop task either alone or in (supposedly incidental) presence of a same-sex 
                                                          
4
 Consistently, Feinberg and Aiello (2006) demonstrated that the physical presence of others is not 
necessary to produce social facilitation effects (see also Aiello & Svec, 1993). Moreover, Park and 
Catrambone (2007) showed that social facilitation can also be induced by virtual humans (i.e., a human 
face presented on the monitor while participants perform the task). In these studies, however, social 
facilitation effects are attributed to evaluation-apprehension factors (see Zajonc, 1965; Cottrell et al., 
1968).  
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confederate. In contrast with the previous studies, however, they manipulated the 
interval between successive stimuli (short vs. long) before they examined the RTs 
distribution (see delta-plot method developed by Ridderinkhof, van den Wildenberg, 
Wijnen, & Burle, 2004). Consistently with previous findings showing that inhibition 
requires time to build up (Eimer, 1999; Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998; Ridderinkhof et 
al., 2004), Sharma et al. observed that the reduction of the Stroop interference under 
social presence occurred only when the interval between successive stimuli was long 
enough to allow participants to inhibit word reading. Conversely, no social facilitation 
was observed when the interval between successive stimuli was so short to reduce 
cognitive control processes. 
On the basis of these results they proposed that social facilitation effects strongly 
depend on inhibition processes that can be affected online by the presence of other 
people.  
 
1.1.2 Conclusive remarks 
The practical implications of all these findings are quite obvious. As a whole, social 
facilitation research, besides providing strong demonstration that the presence of others 
can have an impact on individual performance, can explain why social presence 
sometimes facilitates performance and sometimes impairs it.  
Despite of the large number of theories on this topic, nowadays most social 
psychologists agree that, considering the variety of activities that we perform in public, 
it is unlikely that social facilitation effects can be exhaustively explained by a single 
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mechanism. On the contrary, it is very likely that social facilitation is the result of the 
converging effects of different factors such as increased arousal, distraction and 
awareness of evaluation. Furthermore, it makes sense to assume that social facilitation 
effects can be modulated also by the kind of audience that people are faced with.  
Recently, Flynn and Amanatullah (2012) examined whether specific characteristics of 
co-actors can affect participants’ performance as well. Their findings demonstrated that 
performance gains when participants work nearby high-status co-actors but only if the 
co-action is independent. According to the authors, high-status individuals have strong 
influence over peers and can provide a source of inspiration, thus allowing people to 
elevate their performance. This source of inspiration, however, turns into intimidation 
when the co-action context is competitive.  
 
1.2 JOINT ACTION 
Only recently researchers have started to investigate the cognitive and neural 
mechanisms underlying joint actions. Joint action can be defined as “…any form of 
social interaction whereby two or more individuals coordinate their actions in space and 
time to bring about a change in the environment” (Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 
2006, p.70). It is not necessary to emphasize how important this question is given that, 
in everyday life, we are constantly required to engage in some sort of interactions with 
other people to achieve common goals. 
For this reason, a growing number of studies are trying to establish what determines 
successful joint actions and the degree to which our actions are influenced by specific 
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actions performed by other individuals. A way to assess this issue is to compare a 
situation in which two complementary actions are performed by an actor (individual 
condition) with a situation in which one of the two actions is performed by another 
person (joint condition). The comparison between the individual and the joint 
conditions may reveal important information about whether the co-actor’s task and 
his/her response are represented and how these representations influence one’s own 
performance. This is exactly what Sebanz, Knoblich, and Prinz (2003) did when they 
distributed a Simon compatibility task (Simon & Small, 1969) between two participants 
(i.e., the joint Simon task). By using this paradigm, Sebanz et al. demonstrated that two 
participants, each performing half of the task, show the same compatibility effects of 
single participants performing the whole task (i.e., the joint Simon effect). In the light of 
this finding Sebanz and colleagues (2006) proposed that successful joint actions 
critically (but not only) depend on the ability to form shared task representations, which 
would allow people to integrate their own actions with others actions in a whole action 
planning. 
The seminal study of Sebanz et al. (2003) has given rise to an interesting and substantial 
line of research aimed at investigating the cognitive processes underlying co-
representation and how social relationships between co-actors as well as co-action 
contexts affect co-representations. 
In the next sections I briefly describe the main characteristics of the Simon task, and 
then I provide a brief overview on the joint Simon effect literature. Before that, 
however, I present the ideomotor theory, that is, the theoretical framework of human 
action control that has inspired Sebanz’s et al. approach.  
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1.2.1 The ideomotor theory 
The ideomotor theory is a well-known theoretical framework for action control that 
originated in the 19th century (James, 1890; Lotze, 1852), but started to attract interest 
only at the end of the ‘900 (Prinz, 1987; Greenwald, 1970). The basic idea behind the 
different versions proposed during the years is that perception and action are tightly 
linked together so that imaging an action or perceiving someone else’s action creates a 
tendency to perform that action (Prinz, 1997). Broadly speaking, ideomotor theories 
assume that actions are represented in terms of their perceptual consequences. By 
experiencing different types of actions, a learning mechanism allows humans to 
integrate the motor pattern of these actions with the cognitive representations of their 
respective perceptual consequences. Thereby, humans can activate motor patterns 
associated to specific actions by simply accessing to (or thinking of) the representations 
of their consequences (for a review see Shin, Proctor, & Capaldi, 2010, and Stock & 
Stock, 2004).  
The most influential ideomotor theory is the so-called theory of event coding (TEC; 
Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, and Prinz, 2001; for a review see Hommel, 2011, 
2009). According to this theory, perceived events (stimuli) and produced events 
(actions) are represented in the same system and by means of the same codes, so that the 
cognitive system cannot really distinguish between stimuli and responses. Thus, seeing 
an event activates the action associated with that event, and performing an action 
activates the associated perceptual event. 
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One of the core concepts of TEC framework is that of event file. TEC posits that 
cognitive representations of stimuli and actions are composed of several feature codes, 
which are bound together into a whole event file. According to Hommel et al., every 
external event, including one’s own actions, is stored in an event file. Event files are 
sensorimotor networks of codes representing the features of all perceivable action 
effects. The activation of one code in a given network automatically spreads activation 
to all the other codes in the same network. Thus, “…thinking of an action always 
involves the tendency to generate that action motorically by spreading activation from 
the effect codes to the associated motor codes” (Hommel 2009, p.520; see also Keysers 
& Perrett, 2004; Jeannerod & Decety, 1995).  
A logical implication of the event file concept is that the more features are shared by 
different events (i.e., the more they are similar or the more they overlap), the more they 
can be related to, compared with, or confused with each other. 
Another important aspect of TEC framework is the assumption that cognitive control is 
achieved by an “intentional weighting” mechanism, which is supposed to operate 
offline before actions take place (Hommel et al., 2001; for a review see Memelink & 
Hommel, in press). In a nutshell, the basic idea is that preparing for an action requires a 
top-down priming of those feature dimensions that are relevant to accomplish the task 
(e.g., color, shape, position, or other perceptual or semantic stimulus features). As a 
consequence, all stimulus features that are defined on the selected dimension receive 
more weight and become more salient, thus having a stronger impact on performance. 
Since perceived events (stimuli) and action events (responses) are represented using the 
same feature codes, “…making a particular dimension relevant for perceptual 
14 
 
discriminations should automatically induce task relevance of the same dimension in 
action discriminations” (Memelink & Hommel, in press, p 5). It is important to know, 
however, that although the intentional weighting mechanism fosters the processing of 
task relevant information it does not prevent the irrelevant information to be processed 
and to impact performance. 
Based on the ideomotor framework, which postulates a close link between perception 
and action, it is reasonable to assume that specific other-generated actions can 
selectively affect one’s own actions. This rationale is what has inspired research on 
shared task representations.  
 
1.2.2 The Simon paradigm 
1.2.2.1 The basic phenomenon 
In a typical Simon task, an imperative stimulus (e.g., a red or green square) is randomly 
presented on the left or on the right of the screen, and participants are required to press a 
left or right button depending on a non-spatial attribute of this stimulus (e.g., the color, 
as in the example of Figure 1.1). The Simon effect (e.g., Simon & Small, 1969) refers to 
the finding that, even if stimulus location is task irrelevant, participants are usually 
faster and often more accurate when the position of the stimulus corresponds to the 
position of the required response (i.e., corresponding trials; e.g., left stimulus — left 
response; see Figure 1.1, left panels) than when it does not correspond (i.e., non-
corresponding trials; e.g., right stimulus — right response; see Figure 1.1, right panels). 
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Nowadays, all accounts of the Simon effect share the assumption that this effect is due 
to a competition that occurs, at the response selection stage, between the response 
spatially corresponding to the stimulus, which is automatically activated when the 
imperative stimulus is presented (Eimer, 1995; De Jong, Liang, & Lauber, 1994), and 
the response selected on the basis of the relevant attribute (i.e., dual-route models; 
Zhang, Zhang, & Kornblum, 1999; Kornblum & Lee, 1995; Zorzi & Umiltà, 1995; De 
Jong, Liang, & Lauber, 1994; Kornblum, Hasbroucq, & Osman, 1990). According to 
the dual route models, when the imperative stimulus is presented, it activates the correct 
response via a controlled (indirect) route, which processes the task-relevant stimulus 
Figure 1.1 Example of a typical Simon task. In each trial a stimulus (a colored square) is presented either on 
the left or on the right of the screen but its location is irrelevant to the task. Responses are based on the relevant 
stimulus dimension, which is unrelated to the irrelevant dimension. In the case of this example, the relevant 
stimulus dimension is the stimulus color and participants have to press the left button when the stimulus is red 
and the right button when the stimulus is green. Responses are faster when the stimulus location and the 
response button spatially correspond (left panels) than when they do not correspond (right panels). 
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dimension (e.g., the color) on the basis of the instructions. Simultaneously, the 
imperative stimulus activates the spatially corresponding response via an uncontrolled 
(direct) route, which processes the task-irrelevant stimulus dimension (the stimulus 
location) independently of the instructions. As a result, response selection process is 
facilitated in corresponding trials in which the irrelevant and the relevant stimulus 
dimensions activate the same response code, leading to faster reaction times (RTs). 
Conversely, a conflict takes place in non-corresponding trials in which the irrelevant 
and the relevant stimulus dimensions activate different response codes, thus slowing 
down RTs (see Lu & Proctor, 1995, and Umiltà & Nicoletti, 1992, for a review).  
 
1.2.2.1 The Go/NoGo variant of the Simon task 
The Simon effect is thought to be an index of the representation of two possible 
competitive responses. The activation of the representation of two spatially distinct 
responses, indeed, is the necessary prerequisite for the Simon effect to occur. This 
assumption is further supported by the fact that the Simon effect does not usually occur 
in a Go/NoGo version of the task (Ansorge & Wühr, 2004; Callan, Klisz, & Parsons, 
1974), in which participants are required to respond to only one stimulus value (e.g., the 
red color) and to refrain from responding to the other stimulus value (e.g., the green 
color). Very likely, the absence of the Simon effect in Go/NoGo tasks is due to the fact 
that when only one response key has to be pressed, this response cannot have any 
spatial connotation. Indeed, a response can be coded as left (or right) when it is encoded 
in a context in which there are right (or left) responses. Thus, when only one response is 
required, even if there are some cues that would allow participants to spatially code 
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their response (e.g., the fact that participants use either the left or right hand, or the fact 
that they have to use a response device that is either on the left or on the right with 
respect to another response device), the necessary prerequisite to produce the Simon 
effect (i.e., the presence of an alternative response) is missing.  
Nevertheless, there are several exceptions to this rule (Ansorge & Wühr, 2009, 2004; 
Hommel, 1996). As an example, the Simon effect arises in Go/NoGo tasks if 
participants place a passive finger on the alternative response button (Ivanoff & Klein, 
2001; Hommel, 1996) or when the Go/NoGo task is preceded by a two-choice task in 
which participants press both the alternative buttons (Ansorge & Wühr, 2009, 2004).  
The response-discrimination hypothesis proposed by Ansorge and Wühr (2004; see also 
Ansorge & Wühr, 2009) can account for these exceptions. According to Ansorge and 
Wühr, the Simon effect occurs because participants use the stimulus position to 
discriminate between different responses that are stored in working memory. In 
Go/NoGo tasks the stimulus position is not useful to discriminate between responses, 
given that the two response options are not spatially defined: Participants have to decide 
whether to respond or to withhold the response. However, if the Go/NoGo task is 
executed after a two two-choice task, working memory representations of two distinct 
and spatially-defined responses can be transferred from the first task to the Go/NoGo 
task. In other words, the to-be discriminated responses activated in the two-choice task 
and stored in working memory are then transferred and kept active in the subsequent 
Go/NoGo task, even if only a single response is required. As a consequence, the Simon 
effect occurs in the Go/NoGo task as well. 
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1.2.3 The joint Simon paradigm 
1.2.3.1 The basic phenomenon 
Sebanz et al. (2003) first discovered the phenomenon nowadays known as “joint Simon 
effect”. In their seminal work, Sebanz et al. distributed the Simon task between two 
individuals, sitting next to each other, in such a way that each person responded to only 
one of the two possible values of the stimulus by pressing the button in front of him/her, 
that is, they performed two complementary Go/NoGo task (e.g., one participant 
responded to the red color only and the other participant responded to the green color  
 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Schematic representation of the joint Simon paradigm employed by Sebanz et al. (2003). Two 
participants sit next to each other with two response buttons placed in front of their body. In each trial a picture of 
a hand pointing to the left, right or centrally is presented. The direction of the pointing finger is irrelevant to the 
task. The relevant stimulus attribute is represented by the color of the ring, which can be either red or green. 
Participants are instructed to perform two complementary Go/NoGo tasks: e.g., The participant sitting on the left 
has to respond when the ring is red, whereas the participant sitting on the right has to respond when the ring is 
green. Responses are faster when the direction of the pointing finger corresponds to the position of the responding 
participant (left panel) than when the direction of the pointing finger corresponds to the position of the other 
participant (right panel). 
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only). Targets were presented as colored (i.e., red or green) rings on the picture of an 
index finger pointing to the left, to the right, or centrally (as in the example of Figure 
1.2). In this version of the paradigm, the relevant stimulus attribute was represented by 
the ring color, whereas the irrelevant stimulus attribute was conveyed by the direction of 
the pointing finger. 
Interestingly, although instructions required each participant to perform a Go/NoGo 
task, the Simon effect was nevertheless observed: RTs of each participant were faster 
when the direction of the pointing finger coincided with the position of the participant 
who was in charge of responding (e.g., leftward pointing finger — left-side participant; 
see Figure 1.2, left panel) than when the direction of the pointing finger coincided with 
the position of the co-actor (e.g., rightward pointing finger — left-side participant; see 
Figure 1.2, right panel). Importantly, the Simon effect was observed neither when 
participants carried out the Go/NoGo task individually (i.e., without a co-actor) nor 
when they performed the Go/NoGo task next to a non-actively involved co-actor (i.e., 
when the co-actor merely sat beside the participant without responding to the 
complementary color; see also Tsai, Kuo, Hung, & Tzeng, 2006). Based on these 
findings, Sebanz et al. concluded that responding to the Go stimuli in a joint setting in 
which another person is responding to the NoGo stimuli is functionally similar to the 
condition in which a single person takes care of both stimuli/responses (i.e., in two-
choice Simon tasks). In analogy with what happens in regular two-choice Simon 
paradigms, in joint Simon tasks the response spatially corresponding to the task-
irrelevant spatial code (i.e., left- vs. right-pointing finger) is automatically activated, 
even if this response is assigned to another person. As a consequence, a response 
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selection conflict takes place when the irrelevant and the relevant stimulus attributes 
activate two different responses. Conversely, when participants carry out the Go/NoGo 
task individually (i.e., without a co-actor performing the complementary task), only the 
actor‘s response is represented so that no response conflict occurs and, thus, the Simon 
effect does not show up. Indeed, as previously claimed, the representation of two 
spatially distinct responses is necessary for the Simon effect to occur. 
To account for the joint Simon effect, Sebanz and colleagues proposed that when two 
individuals perform together two complementary parts of the same task, each actor 
represents not only his/her own task but also the task of the co-actor and integrates these 
representations in his/her action planning, the so-called action co-representation 
account (Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006). The occurrence of the Simon 
interference effect in the joint but not in the individual Go/NoGo version of the task has 
been considered a convincing evidence that joint action contexts lead participants to 
form shared representations of tasks, even if it would be more effective to ignore the co-
actor’s task. 
The joint Simon effect has been replicated many times (Sebanz, Knoblich, Prinz, & 
Wascher, 2006; Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2005) and it has been obtained also with 
abstract stimuli, like lateralized colored squares (Hommel, Colzato, & van den 
Wildenberg, 2009; Welsh, Higgins, Ray, & Weeks, 2007; Tsai et al., 2006), and 
auditory stimuli (Ruys & Aarts, 2010; Vlainic, Liepelt, Colzato, Prinz, & Hommel, 
2010; for an extension of the classical paradigm see Ferraro, Iani, Mariani, Nicoletti, 
Gallese, & Rubichi, 2012; Milanese, Iani, Sebanz, & Rubichi, 2011, and Milanese, Iani, 
& Rubichi, 2010).  
21 
 
The action co-representation account of the joint Simon effect (Sebanz et al., 2006) 
relies on the ideomotor theories (Greenwald, 1970; James, 1890; see Section 1.2.1) that, 
as previously mentioned, postulate a close link (i.e., a common code) between 
perception and action. According to these theories, imaging to perform an action as well 
as observing (or knowing about) someone else’s action activates the same motor 
representations that are involved in the execution of that action. These representations 
lead to a tendency to perform that action, which needs to be suppressed (Prinz, 1997). 
Consistently with this assumption, event-related potentials (ERPs) recorded during 
Go/NoGo joint and individual Simon tasks showed that participants exhibit a stronger 
response inhibition in NoGo trials of the joint task than in those of the individual task 
(Tsai, Kuo, Hung, & Tzeng, 2008; Sebanz, Knoblich, Prinz, & Wascher, 2006; Tsai et 
al., 2006; for errors monitoring in joint Go/NoGo tasks see De Bruijn, Miedl, & 
Bekkering, 2011, and De Bruijn, Miedl, & Bekkering, 2008). In a similar vein, the 
results observed by Holländer, Hung, and Prinz (2011) suggest that task sharing leads to 
the activation of the motor system of the non-acting participant when the required 
response is up to the co-actor. Importantly, they observed that this motor activation was 
independent on the specific hand used by the co-actor to perform the task, indicating 
that participants adopted an egocentric perspective in simulating the co-actor’s action. 
 
1.2.3.2 Impact of contextual and social factors on the joint Simon effect 
Since Sebanz’s et al. seminal work (2003), several other studies have been conducted to 
investigate the mechanisms underlying the joint Simon effect. A main issue has been 
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the identification of the conditions that allow others’ actions to be represented and 
included in one’s own action plan.  
Some of these studies suggest that participants can co-represent the co-actor’s action 
also when the visual and auditory feedback from these actions is hampered (Vlainic et 
al, 2010; Sebanz et al., 2003) and even if the co-actor performs the task in a different 
room (Ruys & Aarts, 2010; Tsai et al., 2008).  
For instance Vlainic at al. (2010), by employing an auditory version of the joint Simon 
task, observed the joint Simon effect with participants wearing opaque goggles, which 
prevented them from observing the co-actor’s action, and responding by using a noise-
free keyboard, which did not provide any auditory feedback about the co-actor’s action. 
Consistently, Tsai et al. (2008) and Ruys and Aarts (2010) observed that the mere belief 
of co-acting with another person, who was thought to perform the complementary 
Go/NoGo task in a different room, was sufficient to induce the joint Simon effect (but 
see Welsh et al., 2007, for contrasting results).  
Even participants’ mood was found to modulate the joint Simon effect (Kuhbandner, 
Pekrun, & Maier, 2010). In the study of Kuhbandner et al., participants performed the 
joint Simon task after seeing a neutral or an emotionally-charged movie presented for 
inducing a neutral, positive or negative mood. The results showed that, compared to the 
neutral mood condition, negative mood significantly reduced the Simon effect, whereas 
positive mood significantly enhanced the joint Simon effect. To account for their 
results, Kuhbandner et al. proposed that mood can modulate the tendency to take each 
other’s tasks into account, either by enhancing this tendency (positive mood) or by 
decreasing this tendency (negative mood; see Hommel, 2012). 
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Finally, other studies have provided converging evidence showing that the others’ 
actions can be incorporated into one’s own task representation only when the co-actor is 
perceived as an intentional agent. Indeed, joint action effects were not observed when 
participants were required to share the task with a puppet (Tsai & Brass, 2007; but see 
Stenzel et al., 2012 and Muller et al., 2011a), a computer (Tsai et al., 2008), or a human 
co-actor whose responses were controlled mechanically (Atmaca et al., 2011). 
A related line of research has examined whether the joint Simon effect can be 
modulated by social factors, such as the kind of relationship between the actor and the 
co-actor (Hommel et al., 2009), the cooperative or competitive nature of the interaction 
(Iani et al., 2011; Ruys & Aarts, 2010), and the group membership (Müller, Kühn, et al., 
2011b; Iani, Anelli, Nicoletti, Arcuri, & Rubichi, 2011). For example, Hommel et al. 
(2009) showed that the occurrence of the joint Simon effect depends on the valence of 
the relationship that is established between the two interacting participants. Specifically, 
they observed a joint Simon effect when the co-actor behaved friendly (positive 
relationship) but not when the co-actor acted unfriendly (negative relationship).  
In the same vein, Iani et al. (2011) demonstrated that competition may prevent 
participants from taking into account the co-actor’s task. They observed no joint Simon 
effect when the two interacting participants were required to compete to receive an 
economic reward on the basis of their speed and accuracy (but see Ruys & Aarts, 2010).  
Finally, a recent study of Müller, et al. (2011b) provided evidence supporting the idea 
that even mere group membership can modulate the degree to which others’ actions are 
represented. They observed a joint Simon effect when participants were required to 
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share the task with an in-group member (i.e, an image of a white hand), but not when 
they share the task with an out-group member (i.e., an image of a black hand).  
 
1.2.3.3 What is really co-represented in joint Simon task? 
Another important question pertains to what is really co-represented in joint Simon 
tasks. In a follow-up study, Sebanz and colleagues (2005) provided evidence suggesting 
that co-representations are not restricted to the partner’s actions but comprise also the 
conditions under which these actions have to be performed (see Kiernan, Ray, & Welsh, 
2012 for consistent results demonstrating that even the effects of the co-actor’s actions 
and his/her intentions can be represented). In this study, participants in a pair were 
asked to take care each of one of two different attributes of the same target stimulus: 
One participant had to respond only to one of two possible stimulus colors and the other 
participant had to respond only to one of two possible pointing directions. In half of the 
trials responses of the actor and the co-actor overlapped in time (double response), 
whereas in the other half the actor and the co-actor took turns in responding (single 
response). Results showed a significant slowing down in RTs in double response trials 
as compared to single response trials, thus demonstrating that the performance of each 
participant was influenced by the partner’s task. To account for this finding, Sebanz et 
al. proposed that the impairment of performance in double response trials is the result of 
an increased response conflict produced by the simultaneous activation of two different 
task rules.  
Recently, Wenke, Atmaca, Holländer, Liepelt, Baess, and Prinz (2011), after reviewing 
the literature on the joint Simon effect, suggested that the joint Simon effect might also 
25 
 
be induced by others source of interference, such as the conflict that might arise when 
self-other discrimination is required. According to the authors, the joint Simon effect 
observed in most of the previous studies can be accounted for by assuming that 
participants co-represent that another person is responsible for the complementary part 
of the task and when it is his/her turn of responding. This can lead to an agent 
identification conflict when some aspects of the task (e.g., stimulus position) prime the 
co-actor’s turn (the actor co-representation account; for consistent results see Liepelt, 
Wenke, & Fischer, 2012; Ferraro, Iani, Mariani, Milanese, & Rubichi, 2011; Liepelt, 
Wenke, Fischer, & Prinz, 2011; Philipp & Prinz, 2010; but see Welsh, 2009).  
The assumption that the joint Simon effect reflects action/task co-representations has 
been recently called into question by other authors according to whom performing a 
Go/NoGo Simon task in close proximity to another person simply re-introduce the 
possibility to code spatially two alternative responses (Dolk, Hommel, Prinz, & Liepelt, 
2013; Dittrich, Rothe, & Klauer, 2012; Dolk, Hommel, Colzato, Schütz-Bosbach, Prinz 
& Liepelt, 2011; Guagnano, Rusconi, & Umiltà, 2010). Hence, given that spatial 
response coding is sufficient for the Simon effect to occur in individual Go/NoGo tasks 
(cf. Ansorge & Wühr, 2009, 2004), it makes sense to assume that the spatial coding of 
actor and co-actor positions is sufficient to induce the joint Simon effect as well.  
 
1.2.3.4 The referential coding account of the joint Simon effect 
The results of recent studies have raised some doubts about the social nature of the joint 
Simon effect. Indeed, some authors have advanced the hypothesis that this effect may 
be mainly a spatial phenomenon, induced by the spatial coding of participants’ response 
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position with reference to the sitting position of the co-actor. This would reintroduce a 
dimensional overlap between the task-irrelevant stimulus dimension and the response 
dimension, which is usually missing in individual Go/NoGo Simon tasks.  
The first evidence in favor of this non-social explanation of the joint Simon effect 
comes from a study of Guagnano, Rusconi, and Umiltà (2010). In this study, 
participants in a pair were required to execute two independent detection tasks: One 
participant had to respond only to red stimuli and the other participant had to respond 
only to blue stimuli. The majority of the trials involved the simultaneous presentation of 
the red and blue targets, one on the left and one on the right of the screen, thus 
eliminating the turn-taking aspect that characterized typical joint Simon tasks. Co-acting 
participants performed this task sitting either close to or further apart from each other. A 
Simon effect was observed although the tasks of the actor and the co-actor were 
independent from one another (i.e., the actor and the co-actor did not share any goal). 
More importantly, the Simon effect was present only in the condition in which the actor 
acted in close proximity as compared to the condition in which the co-actor sat far from 
the actor
5
. Based on these results, Guagnano et al. proposed that the presence of another 
person performing a task in the peripersonal space of the participant provides him/her 
with a reference to spatially code his/her own response. The spatial coding of the 
response position of the participant is sufficient to give rise to the Simon effect by 
facilitating participant’s responses in corresponding trials (but see Ferraro et al., 2011 
                                                          
5
 Recently, Welsh, Kiernan, Ray, Pratt, Potruff, and Weeks (2013a) failed to replicate this finding. In their 
study, participants were required to execute two independent detection tasks while sitting outside of each 
other’s peripersonal space. In contrast to Guagnano et al., the authors observed a significant Simon effect 
in this condition (see Guagnano, Rusconi, & Umiltà, 2013, and Welsh et al, 2013b for a discussion).  
27 
 
for results showing that the joint Simon effect is mainly due to interference in non-
corresponding trials rather than to facilitation in corresponding trials).  
In the same vein, a recent study of Dolk et al. (2011) questioned the action co-
representation account. In this study, participants performed the auditory version of the 
joint Simon task while their sense of ownership over the co-actor’s hand was 
experimentally induced through the so-called rubber hand illusion (RHI, Botvinck & 
Cohen, 1998). The RHI is the phenomenon for which seeing a rubber (or another 
person) hand synchronously stroked with one’s own hidden hand produces the illusion 
that the seen rubber hand is part of one’s own body. The RHI illusion does not occur 
when the rubber and the participant hands are stroked asynchronously.  
 
 
Figure 1.3 Experimental setting in Dolk et al. (2011). In each trial one of two sounds was delivered from either 
the left or the right loudspeaker. Participants performed two complementary Go/NoGo task: One participant was 
instructed to respond only to one sound, and the other participant had to respond only to the other sound. During 
the Go/NoGo task, left hands of both the actor and the co-actor were mechanically stroked, either synchronously 
or asynchronously, so as to induce or not the RHI.  
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Dolk et al. used this manipulation to test the assumption that the joint Simon effect 
reflects the integration of the co-actor’s action into the actor’s task representation. The 
participant sat on the right and was required to respond to one of two sounds by 
pressing the button in front of him/her with the right hand (see Figure 1.3). The co-actor 
sat on the left and responded to the complementary sounds by pressing with the left 
hand the button in front of him/her. 
During the task, the left hand of the participant was hidden and stroked either 
synchronously or asynchronously with the left hand of the co-actor, thus to induce or 
not in the actor the illusion of ownership over the co-actor’s hand. According to the 
authors, inasmuch as the joint Simon effect is due to the integration of the co-actor’s 
action in one’s own action planning, this should result into a larger effect in the 
synchronous stroking condition than in the asynchronous stroking condition. Yet, the 
opposite pattern occurred: The asynchronous stroking condition gave rise to a larger 
joint Simon effect as compared to the synchronous stroking condition. Hence, Dolk et 
al. proposed that the joint Simon effect is not due to the integration of the co-actor’s 
action but rather to the separate perception of one’s own action from the co-actor’s 
action. Based on this finding and inspired by TEC framework (Hommel et al., 2001; 
Hommel, 2013; Prinz, 1997; see also Section 1.2.1), Dolk et al. advanced the so-called 
referential coding account of the joint Simon effect (see also Dolk et al., 2013; Dittrich 
et al., 2012; Hommel, 1993). According to the referential coding account, given that 
self-generated and (perceived) other-generated actions are represented by their sensory 
consequences, the presence of another individual sitting next to the participant and 
performing the task can be considered as just another (salient) event which, being it 
29 
 
similar to the actor’s action event, provides him/her with an alternative action. The 
presence of an alternative action requires the participant to discriminate between 
representations referring to his/her action and others concurrently activated 
representations (cf. Ansorge & Wühr, 2004; see also response-discrimination account 
in Section 1.2.2.1). Proper discriminations can be achieved by spatial coding one’s own 
response position with reference to such alternative events. This, in turn, leads to a 
match or a mismatch between stimulus and response sets, which gives rise to the Simon 
effect (Kornblum et al., 1999). 
In a follow-up study, Dolk et al. (2013) demonstrated that any sufficiently salient event, 
not necessary another person, can represent an action alternative to that of the 
participant, thus enabling the spatial coding of the participant’s response position. 
Indeed, they observed a Simon effect in different experiments requiring participants to 
execute individually an auditory Go/NoGo Simon task while different salient events 
(i.e., a Japanese waving cat, a clock, or a ticking metronome) occurred on the side 
opposite to the participant’s response position. 
In line with the referential coding account and with the results reported by Dolk et al. 
(2011, 2013), Dittrich et al. (2012) proposed that the joint Simon effect occurs because 
the spatial arrangement of the two co-acting participants (left vs. right) emphasizes the 
horizontal dimension of the response, which can match or not with the spatial horizontal 
dimension of the stimulus. Consistently, Dittrich et al. did not observe a joint Simon 
effect in the condition in which two co-acting participants, sitting side-by-side, were 
required to perform a Go/NoGo task in which both target stimuli and responses were 
arranged along a vertical dimension. According to the authors, the absence of the Simon 
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effect could be accounted for by assuming that the sitting position of the participants 
made participants to code their responses as “left” and “right” instead of coding them as 
“up” and “down”. As a consequence, the spatial dimension of the responses did not 
match anymore with the spatial dimension of the stimuli and the Simon effect did not 
show up. 
 
1.2.3 Other joint Simon-like paradigms 
The occurrence of an interference effect in joint tasks was recently replicated by 
splitting other Simon-like paradigms in two complementary Go/NoGo tasks, performed 
by two participants sitting side-by-side. For instance, Atmaca, Sebanz, Prinz, & 
Knoblich (2008) distributed between two participants a parity judgment task. This task 
usually requires classifying a centrally presented number (ranging from 1 to 9) as either 
odd or even, by pressing a left or right button. Typically, even though number 
magnitude is irrelevant to perform the task, left responses are faster for numerically 
small numbers, whereas right responses are faster for numerically large numbers, a 
well-known phenomenon called SNARC effect (i.e., Spatial Numerical Association of 
Response Codes; Dehaene, 1997; Dehaene, Bossini, Giraux, 1993). This effect is 
thought to be due to the fact that numbers are spatially represented on a mental number 
line, which is oriented from left to right. The SNARC effect is usually attributed to the 
automatic activation of spatial representations of number magnitudes, which interact 
with response position codes. In the joint version employed by Atmaca et al., one 
participant had to respond only to odd numbers and the other participant had to respond 
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only to even numbers. Results showed that participants sitting on the left reacted faster 
to small than large numbers, whereas participants sitting on the right were faster in 
responding to large than small numbers. In contrast, in the individual Go/NoGo task no 
SNARC effect occurred. Consistently with the interpretation advanced to explained the 
joint Simon effect, the occurrence of the SNARC effect in the joint but not in the 
individual Go/NoGo task seems to suggest that participants activated the representation 
of the co-actor’s action alongside to the representation of their own action, thus giving 
rise to the same conflict between responses that occurs when left and right responses are 
emitted by a single individual. According to Atmaca et al. the occurrence of the joint 
SNARC effect demonstrates that the close link between perception and action can have 
an impact on the processing of symbolic information as well.  
In a further study, Atmaca, Sebanz, and Knoblich (2011) demonstrated that action co-
representations can also occur when the task involves arbitrary stimulus-response 
associations. In this study, a flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) was distributed 
between two participants sat alongside each other. Participants in a pair were presented 
with a string of letters and were instructed to press the button in front of their body 
depending on the identity of the central (target) letter. One participant had to respond 
only when the target was H or K, and the other participant had to respond only when the 
target was C or S. Target letters were flanked on both the left and right sides by 
distracter letters that could be the same as the target (identical trials; e.g., KKKKK), 
assigned to the same participant (congruent trials; e.g., HHKHH), assigned to the co-
actor (incongruent trials; e.g., SSKSS), or associated to none response (neutral trials; 
e.g., UUKUU). The flanker effect refers to the finding that RTs are usually faster when 
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flankers are the same as the target (identical trials) or when they are associated to the 
same response (congruent trials), as compared to the condition in which they require a 
different response (incongruent trials). This effect is thought to reflect the fact that both 
the target and the flankers activate the responses associated with them on the basis of 
the task instructions. As a consequence, performance is facilitated when the target and 
the flankers activate the same response, whereas a conflict takes place when they 
activate different responses (see Cohen & Shoup, 1997; Sanders & Lamers, 2002, for 
reviews). Consistently, Atmaca et al. observed that RTs of each participant were slower 
when the target was flanked by letters that would have required a response from the co-
actor (incongruent trials). The flanker effect occurred also when participants performed 
the same Go/NoGo flanker task individually. However, the effect was significantly 
larger in the joint than in the individual Go/NoGo task.  
Interestingly, the joint flanker effect was not observed when participants performed the 
joint task with co-actor whose responses were controlled by an electromagnet, which 
pulled down the co-actor’s finger when it was his/her turn of responding. This finding 
would demonstrate that for action co-representation to be formed the co-actor has to be 
perceived as an agent acting intentionally.  
Finally, other studies demonstrated that participants performance in joint tasks can also 
be influenced by the co-actor’s focus of attention (the social Navon effect; Bockler, 
Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2012), and by inhibition processes related to the co-actor’s action 
(the social inhibition of return; Cole, Skarratt, & Billing, 2012; Welsh et al., 2005, and 
the social spatial negative priming; Welsh & McDougall, 2012). 
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1.2.4 Conclusive remarks 
After Sebanz’s et al. (2003) seminal study, the literature on the joint Simon effect has 
grown very quickly. Despite of the different interpretations that have been advanced to 
account for this effect, most of the authors agree that the joint Simon task is a useful 
tool to investigate the degree of interpersonal integration. Indeed, the size of the joint 
Simon effect has been found to change as a function of the religious practice (Colzato, 
Zech, Hommel, Verdonschot, van den Wildenberg & Hsieh, 2012), the social self-
construal (Colzato, De Bruijn, & Hommel, 2012) and the cognitive style of thinking 
(Colzato, van den Wildenberg, & Hommel, in press). Furthermore, the joint Simon 
paradigm seems to be useful to evaluate whether and to what extent self-other 
integration can be achieved by clinical samples, such as, individuals with autism 
(Sebanz, Knoblich, & Stumpf, 2005), brain damaged patients (Humphreys & Bedford, 
2011), schizophrenic patients (Liepelt, Schneider, et al., 2012) and congenitally-blind 
individuals (Dolk, Liepelt, Prinz, & Fiehler, 2013).  
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2 
Aims of the study 
 
Recent years have witnessed an increasing overlap between cognitive psychology and 
social psychology. Given that humans are social beings and that the study of human 
behavior cannot prescind from the social context in which it occurs (see Cacioppo, 
Berntson, Lorig, Norris, Rickett, & Nusbaum, 2003), recent studies have started to 
investigate whether, and to what extent, performing a task with (or in presence of) 
another person may change individual performance.  
Interference paradigms are particularly suitable for addressing this issue. The rationale 
is that most of them can be split in two (complementary or different) parts which, in 
turn, can be distributed between two different individuals. By comparing task 
performance when participants act in the joint context and when they perform the task 
individually, important information may be obtained about whether the co-actor’s task 
is represented and how this representation influences one’s own performance.  
The joint Simon task, developed by Sebanz et al (2003), is nowadays one of the most 
widely-used paradigms to address this issue (see Section 1.2.3).  
In the standard version of the Simon task, a single person is required to emit left or right 
responses depending on the color (e.g., red and green) of a target stimulus that randomly 
appears on the left or right side of the screen. The Simon effect refers to the finding that 
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RTs are usually faster and more accurate when the target position corresponds to the 
position of the required response than when it does not correspond (Simon & Small, 
1969). The presence of such an effect demonstrates that, although the target position is 
irrelevant to perform the task, it is automatically processed and it interferes with 
responses, giving rise to a conflict between responses when the target appears on the 
opposite side of the required response (Kornblum & Lee, 1995; De Jong, Liang, & 
Lauber, 1994; Kornblum, Hasbroucq, & Osman, 1990; for a review see Lu & Proctor, 
1995).  
Sebanz et al. (2003) showed that the Simon effect occurs also in the joint version of the 
task – namely the joint Simon effect – in which the two action alternatives (the left and 
right responses associated respectively to the two stimulus colors) are distributed 
between two participants, sitting next to each other, so that each participant performs a 
Go/NoGo Simon task (e.g., the left-side participant responds to the green stimuli only 
and the right-side participant responds to the red stimuli only). Apparently it would be 
nothing surprising about this effect, were it not for the fact that no Simon effect usually 
occurs when participants perform the Go/NoGo Simon task individually, without a co-
actor (Ansorge & Wühr, 2009, 2004; Sebanz et al, 2003).  
As Sebanz et al. (2003) stated, the presence of the Simon interference effect in joint but 
not in individual Go/NoGo tasks is hard to explain in terms of social facilitation 
(Zajonc, 1965; Baron et al., 1978, see Section 1.1), given that studies belonging to this 
area have observed the same pattern of results regardless of whether participants 
performed the task simply in presence of others or with another person engaged in the 
same actions: Typically, performance is facilitated on easy tasks and it is impaired on 
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difficult tasks (Aiello & Douthitt, 2001; Guerin, 1993).Thus, social facilitation effects 
do not seem to depend on the specific actions carry out by other people. Rather, the 
joint Simon effect can be better accounted for within the framework of ideomotor 
theories which, assuming a close link between perception and action, postulate that 
perceiving (or imaging) actions made by others is functionally similar to perform the 
same actions (Prinz, 1997; Hommel et al., 2001; see Section 1.2.1). Consistently with 
ideomotor theories, Sebanz et al. proposed the so-called action co-representation 
account (Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006; Knoblich & Sebanz, 2006). Following 
this account, the joint Simon effect occurs because participants represent (and 
incorporate in their task representation) the action to be executed by the co-actor, thus 
giving rise to the same conflict between actions that arises when they take care of both 
left and right responses (for a different interpretation see Dolk et al., 2013; Dittrich et 
al., 2012; Dolk et al., 2011; Guagnano et al., 2010; see also Section 1.2.3.4 and later in 
this chapter).  
The interference effect was replicated by splitting other Simon-like paradigms in two 
complementary Go/NoGo tasks, performed by two participants sitting side-by-side: the 
joint SNARC effect (Atmaca et al., 2008) and the joint flanker effect (Atmaca et al., 
2011; see Section 1.2.3). For instance, in the study of Atmaca et al. (2008) participants 
were required to respond to either odd or even centrally-presented numbers, ranging 
from 1 to 9, by pressing the button in front of their body. Participants performed this 
task both individually and with a co-actor who was in charge of the complementary task 
(e.g., if the participant responded to odd numbers then the co-actor reacted to even 
numbers). Typically, when a single participant performs the whole parity task 
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individually, by pressing the left and right button, a stable finding is that left responses 
are faster for small than large numbers, whereas right responses are faster for large then 
small numbers. This effect, known as SNARC effect, has been accounted for by 
assuming that numbers are represented in succession along a left-to-right spatially 
oriented line. The spatial information, conveyed by number magnitude, automatically 
interacts with response selection processes, thus slowing down RTs in spatially non-
corresponding trials (e.g., small number – right response; Dehaene, 1997; Dehaene et 
al., 1993). Consistently, Atmaca et al. observed that in the joint SNARC task, 
participants sitting on the left reacted faster to small than large numbers, whereas 
participants sitting on the right were faster in responding to large than small numbers, 
thus resembling the same pattern of results that occurs when a single participant 
performs the whole task individually. In contrast, in the individual Go/NoGo task, 
participants’ RTs were similar for both small and large numbers. According to the 
authors, the occurrence of the SNARC effect in the joint but not in the individual 
Go/NoGo task suggests that, similarly to what happens in joint Simon tasks, participants 
represented the co-actor’s response alongside to their own response.  
In a follow-up study, Atmaca et al. (2011) extended these findings suggesting that 
action co-representation can also occur when the task involves arbitrary stimulus-
response associations. In this study, the authors employed the joint version on another 
well-known interference task, that is, the flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974). 
Typically, this task requires participants to judge, by pressing one of two response 
buttons, the identity of a central target letter, flanked on both sides by distracter letters. 
The flanker effect refers to the fact that participants are usually faster when flankers are 
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the same as the target (identical trials) or when they are associated to the same response 
(congruent trials), as compared to the condition in which they require a different 
response (incongruent trials). Atmaca et al. divided the flanker task in two 
complementary Go/NoGo tasks, which required each participant to respond to two of 
four different target letters. Participants worked on this Go/NoGo task both individually 
and with a partner who responded to the others two target letters. Results showed that, 
in the joint task, participants were significantly slower when the target letter was 
flanked by letters that would have required a response from the co-actor. Importantly, 
the flanker effect occurred also in the individual task but was significantly smaller as 
compared to the effect in the joint task.  
Taken together, all these studies demonstrate that when two participants share an 
interference paradigm in such a way that each of them is responsible for complementary 
parts of the task, they show interference effects that do not usually occur (or are strongly 
reduced) when the same task is performed by each participant alone. As previously said, 
all these joint effects were accounted for by assuming that, in joint tasks, participants 
represent also the co-actor’s action and include this representation in their own action 
planning. As a consequence, interference effects occur when a stimulus feature creates a 
conflict between self- and other-generated responses, similar to the response conflict 
that arises among two self-generated responses (for a review see Knoblich et al., 2011). 
If this is true, namely, if knowing about the co-actor’s task leads automatically to 
activate the representation of his/her response and to integrate it in one’s own action 
planning, one would expect to observe interference effects not only when the actor and 
the co-actor perform two complementary parts of the same task, but also when they are 
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responsible for different parts of the same task. The results of a follow-up study of 
Sebanz et al. (2005) appear consistent with this expectation. In this study, two 
interacting participants were required to respond to two different dimensions of the 
same stimulus. One participant responded to only one of the two possible stimulus 
colors, whereas the other participant responded to only one of the two possible stimulus 
positions. Results showed that RTs were significantly slower on trials that required a 
response from both participants compared to trials that required a response from 
participants in turn. On the basis of this finding, Sebanz et al. concluded that each actor 
co-represent the co-actor’s task to such an extent that performance can deteriorate when 
the two tasks require a response from both actors simultaneously. However, the results 
of a recent study of Heed, Habets, Sebanz, and Knoblich (2010) challenge this 
interpretation. Indeed, Heed et al. demonstrated that sharing an interference paradigm 
with a co-actor, concurrently responsible for a different part of the task, may lead to a 
facilitation effect instead of producing interference. In this study, participants performed 
a visual-tactile interference task in which they were required to judge the location of a 
tactile stimulus (top vs. bottom) while ignoring a visual distractor (a light) that could be 
either spatially-congruent or -incongruent with the target location (e.g., touch at the top 
and light at the top vs. touch at the top and light at the bottom). Participants performed 
the task both alone and with a partner who responded to the visual distractors. Results 
showed that the joint setting significantly reduced the crossmodal interference effect 
(slower RTs for spatially-incongruent trials; Spence, Pavani, & Driver, 2004), which 
typically occurs when the task is performed individually. Importantly, the reduction of 
the crossmodal interference effect was observed neither when the co-actor performed 
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his/her part of the task sitting far from the participant (in the extrapersonal space; but 
see Teneggi, Canzoneri, di Pellegrino, & Serino, 2013) nor when the co-actor responded 
only to a subset of visual distractors (e.g., when the co-actor responded to red lights 
only and not to green lights). 
The finding that the crossmodal interference effect was reduced in the joint condition 
seems to be at odds with the action co-representation account (Sebanz et al., 2006). 
Indeed, following this account, and on the basis of earlier findings on shared task 
representations, the crossmodal interference effect should have been larger in the joint 
than in the individual condition, given that the co-actor’s task (i.e., to respond to the 
position of the irrelevant lights) is supposed to be automatically represented and, as 
such, the interference effect produced by the irrelevant lights should have been larger.  
To account for the reduced crossmodal interference effect observed in their social 
condition, Heed et al. (2010) proposed that sharing a crossmodal interference paradigm 
with a partner acting upon stimuli from a different sensory modality can modulate the 
crossmodal integration by reducing the influence of the distractor stimuli: Knowing that 
the co-actor is taking care of visual stimuli allows participants to ignore them in 
incongruent trials. According to Knoblich et al. (2011) the results observed by Heed et 
al. are not at odds with the action co-representation account (Sebanz et al., 2006) but 
they simply demonstrate that “representing the other’s task could also facilitate task 
performance given that, unlike in previous studies, stimuli from two different sensory 
modalities were distributed between two co-actors” (Knoblich et al., 2011, pp. 79-80). 
Thus, following this hypothesis, the results observed by Heed et al. could be strictly 
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related to the crossmodal nature of the stimuli, that is, to the fact that stimuli belonging 
to two different sensory modalities were distributed between the two participants.  
However, an alternative explanation can be advanced. The different nature of the tasks 
can account for these contrasting results. In the social version of the Simon and others 
Simon-like paradigms participants perform a Go/NoGo task requiring them to take turns 
in responding to two different values of the same target stimulus. The fact that 
participants have to pay attention to the same target stimuli as their respective co-actors 
could inevitably induce them to take into consideration the co-actor’s task and to 
activate the alternative (and complementary) response associated to this task, thus 
producing interference. Note that the same rationale can be applied to the results 
observed by Sebanz’s et al. (2005). In this case, indeed, although the actor and the co-
actor were engaged in two different tasks, after all they were required to pay attention to 
the same target stimuli.  
Conversely, in the paradigm adopted by Heed et al. (2010), the two participants 
executed two independent and simultaneous tasks, which required them to take care of 
two different stimuli. Thus, the fact that another person is concurrently taking care of 
the distractor stimuli could allow participants to succeed in ignoring them. 
Based on this alternative interpretation, one can assume that task sharing produces 
different effects depending on the nature of the task: It gives rise to interference when 
participants have to perform two complementary Go/NoGo tasks, thus working on two 
different values of the same stimulus; whereas it determines a reduction of the 
interference when they have to execute simultaneously two independent tasks, thus 
working on two different stimuli. If this were true, the same finding of Heed et al. 
43 
 
(2010) should be found also when participants perform together and simultaneously two 
independent tasks involving stimuli of the same sensory modality. 
The first study of this thesis aims at testing this hypothesis. Study 1 (Chapter 3) 
comprises three experiments in which I employed the joint version of the picture-word 
interference (PWI) paradigm, which requires participants to name a target picture while 
ignoring a distractor word printed on it (Rosinski, Golinko, & Kukish, 1975; see Section 
3.1 for a more detailed description of this paradigm). The typical finding is that, despite 
the instructions to ignore the word, participants cannot refrain from reading and 
processing the distractor words, and this leads to a performance impairment (i.e., slower 
RTs) when the names of the picture and the written word belong to the same semantic 
category: A phenomenon called semantic interference effect (Rosinski et al., 1975). 
Noticeably, the PWI task can be spit in two different tasks, that is, to name the picture 
and to read the word, which can be concurrently carried out by two different 
participants, thus making the typical PWI task a joint task. Importantly, in contrast with 
the paradigm adopted by Heed et al. (2010), wherein the participants were presented 
with two stimuli of different sensory modalities, in the PWI paradigm the two stimuli 
(the picture and the word) share the same (visual) modality. The implementation of the 
joint version of the PWI, thus, seems particularly suitable to rule out the interpretation 
advanced by Knoblich et al. (2011) and to verify the alternative hypothesis I advanced 
according to which the different effects in joint tasks depend on the different nature of 
the tasks. Specifically, if my interpretation of the effects observed in joint paradigms is 
correct, then sharing a PWI paradigm with a co-actor concurrently responsible for the 
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task irrelevant information should allow participants to ignore the this information, thus 
reducing the semantic interference effect.  
In Study 2 (Chapter 4), instead, I employed the joint version of the Simon task (Sebanz 
et al., 2003) to shed light on the ongoing and quite lively debate about the real nature of 
the joint Simon effect. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 1 (Section 1.2.3.4), the 
assumption that the joint Simon task is an index of action co-representation has been 
recently challenged by the results of other studies that appear to demonstrate that this 
effect simply reflect an instance of spatial coding that occurs independently of the task 
performed by the co-actor (Dolk et al., 2013; Dittrich et al., 2012; Dolk et al., 2011; 
Guagnano et al., 2010).  
The first evidence at odds with the action co-representation account (Sebanz et al., 
2006) comes from a study of Guagnano et al. (2010) who observed that two participants 
performing concurrently two independent detection tasks showed a Simon effect when 
they acted side-by-side, but not when they were far from each other. Guagnano et al. 
proposed that the joint Simon effect occurs because participants spatially code their own 
response using the position of the co-actor as a reference point. Thus, according to the 
authors, the fact that another person is performing the task in close proximity, simply 
reintroduces the possibility to spatially code two response alternatives. 
In the same vein, a recent study of Dolk et al. (2011) provided evidence against the 
action co-representation account. The authors combined the auditory version of the joint 
Simon task with the so-called rubber hand illusion (RHI; Botvinick & Cohen, 1998).  
The RHI refers to the finding that when participants see a rubber hand (or another 
person’s hand) stroked synchronously with their own hidden hand, they feel the illusion 
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of ownership of the rubber hand. Importantly, the same illusion does not occur when the 
rubber and the participant hands are stroked asynchronously. In Dolk’s et al. study 
participants sat on the right and performed the Go/NoGo task with the right hand while 
their left hand was occluded from their view. The confederate sat on the left and 
performed the complementary Go/NoGo task with the left hand. During the task left 
hands of the participant and the confederate were stroked both synchronously and 
asynchronously in separate blocks, thus to induce or not a sense of ownership over the 
co-actor’s hand. The rationale behind this manipulation was the following: If the joint 
Simon effect reflects the integration of the co-actor’s action into one’s own action 
planning then the Simon effect should be larger in the synchronous than in the 
asynchronous stroking condition. Yet, the results showed the opposite pattern, that is, 
the Simon effect was larger in the asynchronous stroking condition (i.e., when 
participants perceived the co-actor’s hand as separated from themselves). According to 
Dolk et al., the larger Simon effect observed in the asynchronous stroking condition is 
probably due to the fact that this manipulation emphasized the existence of an 
alternative action, thus providing participants with a reference to spatially code their 
own action. On the basis of these results, Dolk et al. proposed the so-called referential 
coding account of the joint Simon effect. Following this account, the joint Simon effect 
it not really a social phenomenon but it occurs because the presence of another 
individual, sitting next to the participant and performing the complementary task, 
constitutes a salient event that provides participants with an alternative action, thus 
allowing them to spatially code their own response. Importantly, in a follow up study 
they demonstrated that any salient event, not necessary a response emitted by another 
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person (e.g., even the movement of a ticking metronome), can represent an action 
alternative to that of the participant (i.e., an action from which the participant’s response 
has to be discriminated), which may induce the spatial coding of the participant’s 
response
6
 (Dolk et al., 2013, see also Dittrich et al., 2012)
7
. 
It is important to note that the action co-representation and the referential coding 
accounts share the assumption that in joint tasks the involvement of another person 
leads participants to represent an alternative action. Consistently, Sebanz et al. (2003, 
Experiment 2) observed that no Simon effect occurs when the co-actor merely sat next 
to the participant, without emitting any responses: In this case, indeed, there cannot be 
any alternative action. The two accounts, however, differ from each other with respect 
to the nature of the joint Simon effect: social (for the action co-representation account) 
versus spatial (for the referential coding account). Indeed, following to the action co-
                                                          
6
 Note that the referential coding account can also explain the occurrence of the joint SNARC effect 
(Atmaca et al., 2008), given that the SNARC effect, just like the Simon effect, is caused by a match or a 
mismatch between stimulus and response spatial dimensions. However, this alternative interpretation 
cannot account for the joint flanker effect (Atmaca et al., 2011), given that the flanker effect does not 
depend on the spatial coding of the response position. Yet, it is worth noting that while the Simon effect 
arises only from one type of conflict, that is, that between the irrelevant stimulus dimension (stimulus 
position) and the relevant response dimension, the flanker effect can result from two types of conflicts: 
that between the relevant dimensions of the targets and the distractors and that between the 
responses that are mapped onto targets and distracters (see Kornblum et al., 1999, and Hommel, 2011). 
Thus, the conflict between the relevant dimensions of the targets and the distractors may sufficient to 
induce the flanker effect. Consistently, Atmaca et al. (2011) observed a flanker effect even in the 
individual Go/NoGo flanker task. As a consequence, it is reasonable to assume that in the joint flanker 
task the presence of another person (i.e., of an alternative action) made the response dimension 
relevant, thus causing a larger flanker effect because dependent on two types of conflicts.  
7
 The importance of spatial and contextual factors can be also inferred from the finding that the transfer 
of stimulus-response associations, established in one joint task, to a subsequent joint Simon task (i.e., 
the so-called social transfer of learning) does not occur when spatial factors change across the two 
tasks, while it is not influenced by the manipulation of social factors ( Milanese et al., 2011) 
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representation account, the representation of the alternative action occurs because the 
participant represents the co-actor’s task, which happens to be his/her complementary 
task (see Sebanz etal., 2005). This implies that the mere knowledge about the co-actor’s 
task should be (necessary and) sufficient to produce the Simon effect. In contrast, the 
referential coding account states that an alternative action is represented simply by 
virtue of the fact that the co-actor’s response constitutes a salient event (Dolk et al., 
2011). As a consequence, the participant’s beliefs about what the co-actor is doing 
should not be (either necessary or) sufficient for the Simon effect to occur.  
Typical joint Simon tasks are not suitable to disentangle between these two hypotheses 
and, specifically, given that the co-actor acts nearby the participants, do not allow 
drawing firm conclusions about whether the mere knowledge about the co-actor’s task 
is sufficient to represent an alternative response, thus producing the Simon effect. A 
possible way to shed light on this question is to make the actor and the co-actor 
executing their own part of the task in different rooms. If simply knowing that another 
person is responding to the complementary color is sufficient to spatially code the 
alternative action associated to this color, the joint Simon effect should occur even 
when the co-actor performs his/her part of the task in a different room. Conversely, if 
what allows participants to represent the alternative action is the fact that the co-actor 
represents a salient event then no Simon effect should be observed when the co-actor 
executes his/her task in a different room.  
This possibility is addressed in three experiments of Study 2. Two recent studies (Tsai 
et al., 2008; Ruys & Aarts, 2010) seem to demonstrate that the mere belief of co-acting 
with another person is sufficient to induce the joint Simon effect. In these studies, 
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indeed, the Simon effect was observed despite the actor and the co-actor performed the 
task in two different rooms. However, some methodological aspects of these studies do 
not allow drawing firm conclusions about this question. 
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3 
Study 1 
Task sharing can change the fate of task irrelevant information 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, different studies by employing the joint version of 
well-known interference paradigms demonstrated that when participants in a pair are 
engaged in the same task, taking turns in responding to different values of the same 
target stimulus, they show interference effects that do not usually occur when they 
perform the same part of the task individually (Atmaca et al., 2011, 2008; Sebanz et al., 
2003). These findings provided converging evidence supporting the assumption that, in 
joint tasks, participants co-represent the partner’s task to such an extent that 
performance is affected as if they were performing the partner’s task as well (Knoblich 
et al., 2011; Knoblich & Sebanz, 2006; Sebanz et al., 2006).  
In a recent study, however, Heed et al. (2010) reported a finding that questions the 
possibility that the occurrence of interference effects in joint tasks is an outcome 
generalizable to all conditions in which two individuals work together on the same task. 
Indeed, Heed et al. observed that participants engaged in a visual-tactile interference 
task requiring them to respond to tactile stimuli while ignoring visual distractors, 
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showed a reduction of the interference effect produced by visual stimuli when another 
person was concurrently in charge of them. The results of this study demonstrate that 
task sharing can also lead to a facilitation effect (i.e., a reduction of interference 
produced by distractor stimuli) instead of necessarily producing (or increasing) 
interference.  
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the contrasting results observed by Heed et al. might be due 
to the fact that stimuli from two different sensory modalities were distributed between 
the actor and the co-actor (cf. Knoblich et al., 2011). However, this discrepancy might 
also be accounted for by the fact that in the paradigm adopted by Heed et al. the actor 
and the co-actor were responsible for two different stimuli, as compared with joint 
Simon-like tasks wherein the two co-acting participants were in charge of two different 
values of the same target stimulus. 
Study 1 aimed at testing this latter hypothesis by exploiting the joint version of the PWI 
task (Rosinski et al., 1975), which involves the simultaneous presentation of two 
different stimuli from the same, visual modality.  
The PWI paradigm is considered a variant of classical Stroop task (McLeod, 1991) and 
it is a widely used task in studying the mechanisms underlying language production.  
In the PWI paradigm, participants are presented with a picture and a word superimposed 
on it and they are required to name the target picture while ignoring the distractor word. 
Despite the instructions to ignore the word, participants cannot help reading and 
processing the word, as attested by the finding that the relationship between the target 
and the distractor words influences the time needed to name the picture (e.g., Cubelli, 
Lotto, Paolieri, Girelli, & Job, 2005; Lupker, 1982). For instance, naming RTs are 
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usually slower when the picture (e.g., a carrot) is shown with a word belonging to the 
same semantic category (e.g., pumpkin) than when it is accompanied by a semantically-
unrelated word (e.g., lion). This effect is known as semantic interference effect 
(Rosinski et al., 1975) and it is thought to be due to a selection-by-competition process 
that occurs at the level of lexical node selection (Levelt, Roelofs, & Meyer, 1999; but 
see Mahon, Costa, Peterson, Vargas, & Caramazza, 2007 for a different account). In a 
nutshell, the core assumption of competitive theories is that the selection of a target 
noun depends on the activation levels of both target and non-target names. The lexical 
nodes with the highest activation is selected and further processed. A direct 
consequence of this assumption is that the higher the activation level of non-target 
nodes is, the more time is needed to select the appropriate target node. Thus, when the 
target and distractor words belong to the same semantic category, the distractor node is 
highly activated, receiving this node activation from two different sources: the target 
picture and the distractor word. Conversely, when the target and the distractor words 
belong to different semantic categories, the distractor node receives activation only from 
the distractor word, which makes the semantically-unrelated distractor a weaker 
competitor than the semantically-related distractor. 
The occurrence of the semantic interference effect in PWI paradigms is interpreted as 
the demonstration that word reading occurs automatically (see Posner & Snyder, 1975 
for a definition of automaticity). This assumption is further supported by the 
observation that when task instructions require participants to read the word instead of 
naming the picture, the semantic interference effect does not show up (Glaser & 
Düngelhoff, 1984). 
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Given that the PWI involves the simultaneous presentation of two different stimuli (i.e., 
a target picture and a distractor word), it can be split in two independent parts, that is, to 
name the picture and to read the word, which can be assigned to two co-acting 
individuals working simultaneously on two different stimuli involving the same sensory 
modality. For this reason, the PWI appears particularly appropriate to verify the 
hypothesis that the disappearance of the interference effect observed by Heed et al. 
(2010) was not due to the fact that stimuli from different sensory modalities were 
distributed between the actor and the co-actor, but rather to the fact the co-actor is 
working simultaneously on the task irrelevant information. If this hypothesis were 
correct, then sharing a PWI paradigm with a co-actor responsible for the distractor 
words (i.e., the task irrelevant information) should allow participants to ignore these 
stimuli, thus reducing the semantic interference effect 
 
3.2 EXPERIMENT 1 
In Experiment 1, participants were required to perform the typical PWI task first 
individually (i.e., baseline task) and then co-acting with another person (i.e., joint task). 
The joint task was identical to the baseline task except for the fact that participants were 
informed that they would have performed the task with another person, who was in 
another room, and whose task was to read the words while ignoring the pictures. 
Actually, participants performed the task on their own.  
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To control for possible practice effects, I included in the experimental design a second 
group of participants who, after the baseline, simply continued to execute the same task 
(i.e., they continued to perform the PWI task individually).  
A reduction of the semantic interference effect in the joint condition would provide 
evidence supporting my hypothesis that sharing an interference paradigm with another 
person, concurrently responsible for the task-irrelevant stimuli, can allow participants to 
succeed in ignoring these stimuli just because another person is taking care of them, 
regardless of the fact that the two stimuli, assigned respectively to the actor and to the 
co-actor, share or not the same sensory modality. 
 
3.2.1 Method 
3.2.1.1 Participants 
Thirty-two students (3 males, aged 19-28 years) of the University of Trento participated 
in the experiment. All participants were native speakers of Italian, they had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision and they were naïve to the purpose of the experiment.  
 
3.2.1.2 Apparatus and Stimuli 
Participants seated about 60 cm from the screen. The experiment was run using the E-
Prime 1.1.4.1 software system (Psychology Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA). 
Naming responses were collected with a voice key.  
Stimuli (targets and distractor words) were the same used by Cubelli et al. (2005 - 
Experiment 1). Target stimuli were 16 pictures – belonging to different semantic 
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categories – selected from the set of Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) and presented as 
black line drawings on a white background. Each target picture was paired with two 
distractor nouns of the same semantic category (semantically-related trials) and two 
distractor nouns of a different semantic category (semantically-unrelated trials). Overall 
64 distractor words were chosen. The target and the distractor nouns were matched for a 
number of variables and they did not differ for length, frequency, familiarity, typicality, 
age of acquisition, and phonological overlap between the pairs of target and distractors 
(see Cubelli et al., 2005 for further details). A set of 16 additional pictures and 32 
additional distractor words were also selected and used as filler stimuli. Target and 
distractor nouns belonging to the filler set were all semantically and phonologically 
unrelated. Both target pictures and distractor words were presented in the center of the 
screen. The size of each picture was 6 × 6 cm, whereas distractor words appeared in 
upper case format (e.g., MOUSE), Courier new 18-point bold font. 
 
3.2.1.3 Procedure 
Once recruited for the experiment, participants were randomly assigned to one of two 
experimental conditions: social or control condition (see Figure 3.1). In each condition, 
participants performed the PWI task twice, first individually (baseline task) and then 
either co-acting with another person (social condition) or again individually (control 
condition). Despite of the implementation of a within subjects design, the baseline and 
the joint tasks were not counterbalanced across participants. The reason is that if the 
joint task comes first, the impact of this task could persist in the individual task, thus  
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preventing the possibility to have a true individual task as a baseline for comparison (cf. 
Huguet et al., 1999). 
In all tasks, trials began with the presentation of a fixation cross displayed in the center 
of the screen. After 500 ms the fixation cross was replaced by a picture-word pair, 
which remain on the screen until the response but no more than 2000 ms. The target 
picture was always presented simultaneously with the distractor word. Offset of the 
picture-word pair was followed by a blank of 700 ms. Participants were instructed to 
Figure 3.1. Schematic representation of the experimental design adopted in Experiment 1. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions: control or social. Each experimental condition 
comprised two tasks (i.e., the baseline individual task and the critical task). Conditions were defined as either 
control or social depending on the task participants performed after the baseline task. Participants assigned to 
the control condition, after completed the baseline, simply continued to perform the same task individually. In 
contrast, participants assigned to the social condition, after the baseline, were required to perform the same task 
with an alleged co-actor who was in a not-specified room and was thought to read the distractor words. 
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name the target picture by producing the corresponding bare noun as quickly and 
accurately as possible while ignoring the distractor word. Errors and malfunctioning of 
the voice key were recorded online by the experimenter. In the joint task, participants 
performed the task with an alleged partner, who was in a non-specified room and was 
thought to read the distractor words. To online remind participants that another person 
was engaged in the task, a visual feedback (i.e., a green O) was presented in the center 
of the screen at the end of the blank to signal participants whether the co-actor had 
responded or not. Participants were informed that this feedback was non-informative 
about the co-actor’s speed and accuracy. Indeed, they were told that, since the co-actor’s 
response might have overlapped in time with their response, the feedback would have 
been provided always at the end of each trial.  
Each task consisted of 96 trials, in which each picture-word pair was presented once. 
Among these trials, 32 were fillers and were not considered in the analyses. The 
remaining 64 trials were half semantically-related and half semantically-unrelated. 
Pseudorandom experimental lists were created according to the following criteria: (a) 
the first two trials were filler; (b) either semantically-related or –unrelated pairs could 
appear in no more than three consecutive trials; (c) target belonging to the same 
semantic category could not appear in consecutive trials. In all tasks, experimental trials 
were preceded by 8 practice trials, in which both target pictures and distractor words 
were different from those used in the experimental trials. To allow participants to 
familiarize with the experimental pictures and to induce the use of the expected name, 
before the baseline, participants were presented with all pictures twice with a string of 5 
#s instead of the distractor word and were asked to name them. After naming the 
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picture, the string of #s was replaced by the corresponding picture name, which was 
shown on the screen for 2000 ms.  
 
3.2.2 Results and discussion 
Four type of responses were excluded from the analyses: (a) naming errors; (b) failures 
by the voice key to record the response; (c) verbal disfluences that triggered the voice 
key; (d) RTs exceeded two standard deviations from a participant’s mean. Overall 10.99 
% of the responses were excluded from the analysis, of which 1.66 % were naming 
errors. Errors were not analyzed. 
For each experimental condition (control and social), correct RTs were submitted to an 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with two within-subjects factors: task (baseline vs. 
second task) and semantic relatedness (semantically-related vs. -unrelated trials). The 
main effect of semantic relatedness was significant in both control and social conditions 
[both Fs≥5.86, both ps<.05; both p
2s≥.28]: Participants were slower in semantically-
related than –unrelated trials (737 vs. 714 ms and 747 vs. 729 in the control and social 
conditions, respectively). Task was significant only in the social condition [F(1, 
15)=4.94, p<.05, p
2= .25 ]: Participants were faster in the joint than in the baseline task 
(727 vs. 750 ms). The Task×Semantic relatedness interaction was significant neither in 
the control nor in the social condition [both Fs≤.72, both ps≥.41, both p
2s≤.004], 
indicating that the semantic interference effect was present in both the baseline and the 
second task (i.e., the repetition of the individual PWI task in the control condition and 
the joint task in the social condition; see Figure 3.2).  
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These results were confirmed by mixed effect regression analyses
8
 carried out taking 
participants and items as random effects (see Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008 for 
further details about the statistical procedure). In each condition, models were fitted by 
initially defining the simplest models with participants and items as random factors. 
These models were then enriched by subsequently adding the two fixed factors: 
semantic relatedness first and then task. Finally, the interaction between task and 
semantic relatedness was added to the models. Once all models were defined, the best 
fitting model (i.e., the model that significantly improved the fit of the data) was selected 
by comparing, through a log-likelihood test, the goodness-of-fit of the model before and 
                                                          
8
 Mixed effect regression analyses were carried out using lme4 (Bates & Maechler, 2010) and Language 
R (Baayen, 2008) packages implemented in the open-source statistical program R (R development core 
team, version 2.15.0).  
Figure 3.2. Means (± S.E.M.s) of correct RTs for each experimental condition in Experiment 1. For each 
condition, RTs are plotted as a function of task (baseline vs. second task) and semantic relatedness 
(semantically-related vs. -unrelated trials). Asterisks indicate the presence of the semantic interference effect. 
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after enriching it with an additional factor. For the control condition, the best fitting 
model included, besides the two random factors (i.e., participants and items), only the 
fixed factor semantic relatedness, which significantly improved the fit (χ²=15.82, 
p<.001). For the social condition, the best fitting model included, besides the two 
random factors, the fixed factors semantic relatedness and task, which significantly 
improved the fit (χ²=16.11, p<.001). Models which additionally included the 
Task×Semantic relatedness interactions did not further improve the fit in both 
conditions (both χs²≤2.84, both ps≥.24). 
In the present experiment the semantic interference effect was observed in both 
conditions and was not modulated by the type of task participants performed after the 
baseline. Indeed, this effect was still observed not only in the group of participants who 
continued to perform the PWI task individually but also in the group of participants who 
performed the joint task. Thus, in contrast with our predictions, task sharing had no 
influence on the size of the semantic interference effect. The social manipulation seems 
only to reduce significantly participants’ naming RTs, which is considered a typical 
outcome in case of simple tasks performed in presence of other individuals (i.e., social 
facilitation effect; Guerin, 1993; see also Section 1.1).  
However, this does not necessary mean a failure to replicate the finding observed by 
Heed et al. (2010). The null result observed in the present experiment can be trace back 
to the automaticity of written word recognition that may prevent participants from 
ignoring the distractor words. In other words, participants cannot avoid reading and 
processing written words even if they know that another person is in charge of these 
stimuli. If this were the case, any experimental manipulation able to hamper written-
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word recognition should provide participants time enough to filter distractor words out 
from their task representation. Of course, this outcome is expected only when someone 
else is taking care of distractor words. 
This possibility was addressed in Experiment 2.  
 
3.3 EXPERIMENT 2 
The aim of this experiment was to verify the possibility that when written-word 
recognition in the PWI task is delayed or impaired, the belief of co-acting with another 
person – responsible for the distractor words – may allow participants to ignore these 
stimuli (i.e., the co-actor’s stimuli). That should turn into the disappearance or (at least) 
the reduction of the semantic interference effect in the joint task. To this end, distractor 
words were shown in case alternation letters. Case alternation has been found to delay 
word recognition (e.g., Mayall, Humphreys, & Olson, 1997), but, importantly, it does 
seem to modulate interference effects that occur in PWI tasks (see Miozzo & 
Caramazza, 2003).  
As in Experiment 1, participants performed the PWI task first individually (baseline) 
and then either they continued to perform the task individually (control condition) or co-
acting with an alleged co-actor who was thought to read the distractor words (social 
condition; see Figure 3.3).  
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3.3.1 Method 
3.3.1.1 Participants 
Thirty-two students (3 males, aged 19-28 years) of the University of Trento who were 
all native speakers of Italian took part to the experiment. They all had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision, did not participate to the Experiment 1 and were naïve to the 
purpose of the experiment.  
Figure 3.3. Schematic representation of the experimental design adopted in Experiment 2. The experimental 
design was identical to that of Experiment 1: Participants were randomly assigned either to the control or to the 
social condition. After completed the baseline task, they were required either to continue to perform the PWI 
task individually (control condition) or with a co-actor who was supposed to read the distractor words (social 
condition). In contrast with Experiment 1, distractor words were shown in case alternation letters. 
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3.3.1.2 Apparatus, Stimuli and procedure 
The apparatus, stimuli, procedure and the experimental design were the same as those in 
Experiment 1 with the following exception: Distractor words were shown with 
alternated case (e.g., mOuSe).  
As in Experiment 1, participants were randomly assigned to one of two experimental 
conditions: social or control condition. 
 
3.3.2 Results and discussion 
Data were processed following to the same procedure used in Experiment 1, and 10.89 
% of the data points were removed (2.40 % were naming errors). Correct RTs were 
submitted to the same analyses carried out in Experiment 1. Task was significant only in 
the social condition [F(1, 15)=8.08, p<.05, p
2=.35]: Participants were faster in the joint 
than in the baseline task (733 vs. 760 ms). The main effect of semantic relatedness was 
significant in both control and social conditions [both Fs≥10.88, both ps<.01; both 
p
2s≥.42] with participants slower in the semantically-related than –unrelated trials (747 
vs. 725 ms and 756 vs. 737 ms in the control and social conditions, respectively). The 
Task×Semantic relatedness interaction was not significant in the control condition [F(1, 
15)=.30, p=.60; see Figure 3.4]. Semantic interference effects of 25 and 20 ms were 
observed in the baseline and in the repetition of the PWI task, respectively. Most 
importantly, this interaction was significant in the social condition [F(1, 15)=5.33, 
p<.05, p
2
=.26]. Post-hoc analysis (Newman-Keuls) revealed that the difference 
between semantically-related and –unrelated trials (775 vs. 744 ms and 736 vs. 731 ms 
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in the baseline and joint tasks, respectively) was significant in the baseline task (p<.005) 
but not in the joint task (p=.53). These results were confirmed by mixed models 
analyses. For the control condition, the best fitting model included, besides the two 
random factors, only the fixed factor semantic relatedness, which significantly improved 
the fit (χ²=15.63, p<.001). For the social condition, the best fitting model was the most 
complex one (i.e., the model including, besides the two random factors, both the two 
fixed factors and their interaction), which significantly improved the fit (χ²=4.61, 
p<.05).  
In this experiment I observed the semantic interference effect although alternated-case 
distractor words were used. As previously stated, this manipulation is thought to impair  
 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Means (± S.E.M.s) of correct RTs for each experimental condition in Experiment 2. For each 
condition, RTs are plotted as a function of task (baseline vs. second task) and semantic relatedness 
(semantically-related vs. -unrelated trials). Asterisks indicate the presence of the semantic interference effect. 
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written-word recognition (e.g., Mayall et al., 1997) but nevertheless it does not seem to 
influence the size of interference effects that occur in PWI tasks. This finding is 
consistent with that of Miozzo and Caramazza (2003).  
More interestingly, the results of the present experiment demonstrate that when written-
word recognition is impaired – here, by case alternation – the mere belief of co-acting 
with another individual, besides speeds up participants’ RTs (as already observed in the 
social condition of Experiment 1), eliminates the semantic interference effect. This 
latter finding cannot be attributed to the significant reduction of RTs. Indeed, the 
semantic interference effect continued to be present in the social condition of 
Experiment 1 despite participants were significantly faster in the joint than in the 
baseline task.  
The results of the social condition of Experiment 2 can instead be explained by 
assuming that task sharing led participants to succeed in ignoring the distractor words 
because another person was in charge of them. Furthermore, given that in the PWI 
paradigm the target and the distractor stimuli share the same sensory modality, the 
present results allow rejecting the hypothesis that the disappearance of the interference 
effect observed by Heed et al. (2010) is strictly restricted to the tasks in which stimuli 
from different sensory modalities are distributed between two participants. Conversely, 
the disappearance of the interference effect seems to be due to the fact that the co-actor 
is thought to work simultaneously on the task irrelevant information. The information 
about the co-actor’s task in a context of impaired word recognition would provide 
participants with an effective strategy to ignore the distractor stimuli that are in charge 
of someone else.  
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Thus, the facilitation effect seems to emerge only when the actor and the co-actor work 
on different stimuli.  
However, an alternative interpretation deserves to be considered. The disappearance of 
the semantic interference effect may have been caused by a mere social facilitation 
effect: Knowing that another person was involved in the task might have had a 
distracting effect and, in order to fully concentrate on the task, participants might have 
narrowed their attention on the relevant information (the pictures) and suppressed the 
processing of all stimuli unrelated to their task (the distractor words; cf. Baron, 1986; 
Huguet et al., 1999; see also Section 1.1.1). If this were the case, then what the co-actor 
is supposed to do is irrelevant and the semantic interference effect should disappear also 
when the co-actor is thought to be in charge of the same stimuli as the participant. In 
contrast, if what allowed the semantic interference effect to disappear was the fact that 
the co-actor was thought to work on different stimuli, then the semantic interference 
effect should persist when the co-actor is thought to be in charge of the same stimuli as 
the participant.  
To rule out this alternative interpretation I run Experiment 3. 
 
3.4 EXPERIMENT 3 
Experiment 3 aimed at excluding the possibility that the disappearance of the semantic 
interference effect observed in the social condition of Experiment 2 was simply due to a 
social facilitation effect. To this end, once completed the individual (baseline) task, 
participants were required to perform a joint task in which the co-actor was thought to 
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work either on the distractor words (joint–different target task) or on the pictures (joint–
same target task). In contrast with Experiments 1 and 2, target pictures were randomly 
shown in nine different colors, whereas distractor words were shown in case alternation 
letters (and in black), as in the Experiment 2.  
In the joint task in which the participant and the co-actor were supposed to work on 
different target stimuli, participants were informed that the co-actor was reading the 
distractor words and ignoring the pictures. The instructions of this joint task were 
identical to those of Experiments 1 and 2 and, thus, they emphasized the fact the co-
actor was taking care just of those stimuli that the participant had to ignore. Conversely, 
in the joint task in which the participant and the co-actor were supposed to work on the 
same target stimuli, participants were told that the co-actor was naming the color of the 
pictures and ignoring the words. In this case, the instructions emphasized the fact that 
the co-actor was taking care of a different aspect of the same target stimuli assigned to 
the participant and that nobody was taking care of the distractor words.  
Importantly, in both joint tasks, the co-actor was supposed to perform a different task, 
thus preventing the occurrence of possible competitive (or social comparison) effects 
(cf. Huguet et al., 1999). 
As in the previous experiments, to rule out possible practice effects, I included a control 
condition in which participants continued to perform the PWI task individually. 
The following predictions can be made. First of all, the semantic interference effect 
should occur in the baseline task of all experimental conditions and it should continue to 
be present in the repetition of the task. There is no reason, indeed, to expect that the 
semantic interference effect can be modulated by the presentation of colored target 
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pictures. Even though the use of colors might make the pictures more salient and might 
help participants to direct the attention on these stimuli, it should not be sufficient to 
prevent them from reading the distractor words, thus to reduce the semantic interference 
effect.  
Secondly, I expect the semantic interference effect to disappear in the joint task in 
which the co-actor is thought to be in charge of the distractor words, thus replicating the 
finding observed in the joint task of Experiment 2.  
Most importantly, if the disappearance of the semantic interference effect observed in 
the joint task of Experiment 2 was due to a generic social facilitation effect, then the 
semantic interference effect should disappear even in the joint task in which the co-actor 
is thought to name the color of the pictures. Following the social facilitation theories, 
indeed, the distracting effect produced by the involvement of another person in the task 
should give rise to a narrowing of the attention on the target stimuli, regardless of the 
co-actor’s task. Conversely, if what caused the semantic interference effect to disappear 
was the fact that the co-actor was simultaneously taking care of the distractor words 
(i.e., s/he was working on different stimuli), then the semantic interference effect should 
continue to be present in the joint task in which the co-actor is supposed to name the 
color of the pictures. In this case, indeed, given that nobody is taking care of the 
distractor stimuli, participants are not supposed to ignore these stimuli.  
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3.4.1 Method 
3.4.1.1 Participants 
Sixty-four students (5 males, aged 19-28 years) of the University of Trento who were all 
native speakers of Italian took part to the experiment. They all had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision, did not participate to the Experiments 1 and 2, and were naïve to the 
purpose of the experiment.  
 
3.4.1.2 Apparatus, Stimuli and procedure 
The apparatus, stimuli, procedure and the experimental design were the same as those in 
Experiment 2 with the following exception: Target pictures were presented as colored 
line drawings. Nine different colors were used: red, pink, azure-blue, yellow, brown, 
orange, blue, green and violet. The color of the target pictures varied randomly with the 
restrictions that a) pictures of the same color could not appear in consecutive trials, and 
b) the color of picture was in no way related to the depicted object (e.g., the carrot was 
never shown in orange). 
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Participants were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions: social–
different target (–DT), social–same target (–ST), or control condition (see Figure 3.5). 
 
3.4.2 Results and discussion 
Data were processed following to the same procedure used in Experiments 1 and 2, and 
9.2 % of the data points were removed (1.03 % were naming errors). Correct RTs of 
each experimental condition were submitted to the same analyses carried out in 
Experiments 1 and 2.  
Figure 3.5. Schematic representation of the experimental design adopted in Experiment 3. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions: control, social–DT or social–ST. In contrast to the 
previous experiments, target pictures were randomly shown in nine different colors. Distractor words were 
shown in alternated-case letters as in Experiment 2. The control and the social–DT conditions coincided with the 
control and social conditions of the previous experiments, whereas the social–ST condition was new of this 
experiment. Participants assigned to this latter condition, after the baseline, performed a joint task in which they 
were told that the co-actor was naming the color of the pictures.  
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Task was significant in both social conditions [both Fs≥5.41, both ps≤.05, both 
p
2s≥.27]: Participants were faster in the joint tasks as compared to the baseline tasks 
(701 vs. 729 ms in the social–ST condition and 691 vs. 712 ms in the social–DT 
condition). The main effect of semantic relatedness was significant in all conditions [all 
Fs≥12.20, all ps<.005; all p
2s≥.45] with participants slower in the semantically-related 
than –unrelated trials (704 vs. 684 ms, 728 vs. 702 ms, and 712 vs. 691 ms in the 
control, social–ST, and social–DT conditions, respectively). The Task×Semantic 
relatedness interaction was significant only in the social–DT condition [F(1, 15)=9.14, 
p<.01, p
2
=.38; see Figure 3.6]. Post-hoc analysis revealed that the difference between 
semantically-related and –unrelated trials (729 vs. 698 ms and 695 vs. 685 ms in the 
baseline and joint–different target tasks, respectively) was significant in the baseline 
task (p<.001) but not in the joint task (p=.08). The interaction was significant neither in 
the control nor in social–ST conditions [both F≤.40, both p≥.40]. In the control 
condition, semantic interference effects of 24 and 17 ms were observed in the baseline 
and in the repetition of the PWI task, respectively. In the social–ST condition, semantic 
interference effects of 30 and 23 ms were observed in the baseline and in the joint–
different target task, respectively. 
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These results were confirmed by mixed models analyses. For the control condition, the 
best fitting model included, besides the two random factors, only the fixed factor 
semantic relatedness, which significantly improved the fit (χ²=18.64, p<.001).  
For the social–ST condition, the best fitting model included, besides the two random 
factors, the fixed factors task and semantic relatedness, which significantly improved 
the fit (χ²=36.62, p<.001).  
For the social–DT condition, the best fitting model was the most complex one (i.e., the 
model including, besides the two random factors, both the two fixed factors and their 
interaction), which significantly improved the fit (χ²=4.84, p<.05).  
The results of Experiment 3 confirm the findings of Experiment 2: When written-words 
recognition is delayed by case alternation, the belief of co-acting with another 
individual, who is supposed to work on the distractor words, determines the 
disappearance of the semantic interference effect. Importantly, the results of the present 
Figure 3.6. Means (± S.E.M.s) of correct RTs for each experimental condition in Experiment 3. For each 
condition, RTs are plotted as a function of task (baseline vs. second task) and semantic relatedness 
(semantically-related vs. -unrelated trials). Asterisks indicate the presence of the semantic interference effect. 
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experiment allow rejecting the hypothesis that the suppression of the semantic 
interference effect may be due to a generic social facilitation effect. Indeed, the 
disappearance of the semantic interference effect was observed in the joint task in which 
participants believed that the co-actor was reading the distractor words (joint–different 
target task) but not in the joint task in which the co-actor was thought to name the color 
of the pictures (joint–same target task). Based on social facilitation theories, I should 
have observed the same pattern of results in both joint tasks. According to these 
theories, knowing that another person in involved in the task might lead participants to 
focus their attention on the task relevant information and to filter out the task irrelevant 
information, regardless of the specific task performed by the other person.  
Furthermore, the disappearance of the semantic interference effect cannot be attributed 
to the significant reduction of RTs either. Indeed, although the belief of co-acting with 
another person speeded up participants’ RTs in both joint tasks, the semantic 
interference effect disappeared only in the joint task in which the co-actor was supposed 
to read the distractor words. As previously stated, the significant reduction in RTs is 
typically observed when people perform simple tasks in joint contexts (Guerin, 1993). 
Conversely, the present findings provide a firm demonstration that what allowed 
participants to succeed in ignoring the distractor words was just the fact that someone 
else was in charge of these stimuli. Indeed, when nobody was thought to take care of 
these stimuli, as occurred in the individual and in the joint–same target tasks, the 
semantic interference effect continued to be present.  
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3.5 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In the present study I observed that when participants believe to perform the picture-
word task with a co-actor who simultaneously is responding to the distractor words, this 
information makes the semantic interference effect to disappear. Very likely this result 
is strictly dependent on the social setting which, however, is effective only when written 
word recognition is made more difficult by case alternation, probably because of the 
automaticity of the effect investigated in this study.  
Thus, the results of the Experiment 2 confirm and extend the findings reported by Heed 
et al. (2010). Importantly, given that in the social condition of my study participants 
worked on two different stimuli involving the same modality, I can rule out that this 
outcome is restricted to the conditions in which the co-actor performs a task which 
involves stimuli from a different sensory modality as that of the participant. Instead, I 
suggest that the reduction (or the suppression) of the interference effect can be 
considered as a consistent outcome resulting from sharing an interference paradigm 
with another person working simultaneously on the task irrelevant information.  
The results of Experiment 3, besides confirming those of Experiment 2, allow ruling out 
that the disappearance of the semantic interference effect may have been caused by a 
generic social facilitation effect. As previously discussed in this chapter, this same 
outcome would have been expected on the basis of the attentional theories proposed 
within the social facilitation area (Huguet et al., 1999; Baron, 1986; Baron et al., 1978; 
see also Section 1.1.1). According to these theories, knowing that another person is 
involved in the task may threat participants with a cognitive overload (or an increased 
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arousal), resulting from an attentional conflict between the co-actor and the task
9
. This, 
in turn, would cause a restriction of the focus of the attention on the task relevant 
information, thus increasing the ability to ignore the task irrelevant information, at least 
when the task involves the presentation of few stimuli. The fact that the semantic 
interference effect was still observed in the joint task in which the co-actor was in 
charge of the same stimuli as the participant (i.e., in the joint–same target task of 
Experiment 3) rules out such a kind of explanation. 
Furthermore, it is hardly likely that the disappearance of the semantic interference effect 
may be traced back to the establishment of a possible competitive relationship between 
the participant and the alleged co-actor. Indeed, competitive mechanisms do not usually 
build up when the actor and the co-actor perform different tasks, as in this case it does 
not make any sense to compare one’s one performance with that of the other person (cf. 
Sanders et al., 1978). In addition, if this were the case, a competitive mechanism should 
have been developed also in the joint task in which the co-actor was naming the color of 
the pictures, thus determining the disappearance of the interference effect in this task as 
well.  
In contrast, the disappearance of the semantic interference effect seems to be critically 
related to the fact that the co-actor was thought to take care just of those stimuli that the 
participant had to ignore because they were irrelevant to perform the task.  
Consistently with Heed et al. (2010) interpretation, I propose that the belief of co-acting 
with another person who simultaneously takes care of the task irrelevant stimuli allows 
                                                          
9
 Importantly, it has been shown that for social facilitation effects to occur, the physical presence of the 
co-actor is not necessary (see Dumas et al., 2005).  
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participants to filter out these stimuli from their task representation, just because another 
person is in charge of them. In other words, task sharing may induce the implementation 
of a division-of-labor between the two participants such to allow the task irrelevant 
information, which is usually destined to be processed, to be instead ignored. Probably 
the implementation of this division-of-labor is achieve through an intentional weighting 
mechanism (Hommel et al., 2001), operating on participants’ task representation: 
Knowing that another person is in charge of the distractor stimuli makes participants to 
increase the weight (and thus the salience) of the task relevant information (i.e., of their 
own stimuli) at the expense of the task irrelevant information (i.e., the co-actor’s 
stimuli), which then is easily discarded from the representation of the own task. That 
said I can assume that distractor words are filtered out at the perceptual level.  
This proposal is in line with other findings showing the role of top-down factors such as 
intention, attention and task set in modulating automatic processes (see Kiefer, 2007).  
To conclude, even though these findings do not question the assumption underlying the 
action co-representation account that task sharing induces participants to represent also 
the co-actor’s task (Sebanz et al., 2006), they cast some doubts on the fact that this 
necessarily leads participants to integrate this latter task and the co-actor’s action into 
their own task representation. Indeed, the present data suggest that representing the co-
actor task can also induce to exclude it from one’s own task representation. Thus, it can 
be advanced the hypothesis that joint tasks can determine both integration and division 
processes. However, the former leads to response conflict and, thus, to interference 
effects, whereas the latter causes the reduction of interference effects. As I have 
previously suggested, the kind of paradigm that participants are required to share can be 
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responsible for the occurrence of either integration or division processes. For instance, it 
is possible that integration processes occur when the actor and the co-actor take turns in 
responding to different values of the same target stimulus, as happens in joint Simon-
like tasks, whereas division processes become necessary and fruitful when the two 
interacting participants are responsible for different stimuli.  
However, it is also possible that the occurrence of interference effects in joint Simon-
like paradigms is caused by the combination of different factors. For example, 
nowadays there is a quite heated debate on the mechanisms underlying the joint Simon 
effect. This debate was triggered by the results of recent studies that raised some doubts 
on the social nature of this effect by demonstrating, for example, that any salient event 
occurring on the side opposite to the participant’s position (e.g., the presence of a clock) 
is sufficient to induce it (Dolk et al., 2013; see also Dittrich et al., 2012; Dolk et al., 
2011; Guagnano et al., 2010).  
This question is addressed in Study 2.  
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4 
Study 2 
When task sharing eliminates the Simon effect 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Study 2 aimed at shed light on the mechanisms underlying the joint Simon effect. Two 
different accounts can be distinguished: the action co-representation account (Sebanz et 
al., 2006; Sebanz et al., 2005) and the referential coding account (Dolk et al., 2013; 
Dittrich et al., 2012; Dolk et al., 2011; Guagnano et al., 2010). According to the action 
co-representation account, the joint Simon effect reflects the fact that, in joint Go/NoGo 
Simon tasks, participants co-represent the co-actor’s task and integrate his/her response 
in their own task representation as if they were executing the co-actor’s response as 
well. Thus, on the basis of this account, the joint Simon effect would be mainly a social 
phenomenon and it would demonstrate that task representations are socially shared. 
Conversely, according to the referential coding account, the joint Simon effect occurs 
simply because the presence of another person, sitting next to the participant and 
performing a task, represent a salient event that provides participants with an alternative 
action for spatially coding their own response. Thus, on the basis of this account, the 
joint Simon effect would be mainly a spatial phenomenon. 
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It is interesting to note that both interpretations share the idea that in joint Simon tasks 
the presence of another person – actively involved in the task – allows participants to 
represent also the alternative action: The representation of two spatially distinct action 
alternatives, in turn, leads to a match or a mismatch between stimulus and response sets, 
which gives rise to the Simon effect (Kornblum et al., 1999). However, following the 
action co-representation account, the representation of the alternative action is induced 
by knowing that the co-actor is performing the complementary task. A logical 
implication is that the mere knowledge about the co-actor’s task, besides being 
necessary, should also be sufficient to give rise to the Simon effect. Conversely, 
according to the referential coding account, the alternative action is represented simply 
because the co-actor’s response constitutes a salient event occurring on the side opposite 
to the participant’s response position. As a consequence, knowing the co-actor’s task 
should be neither necessary nor sufficient for the Simon effect to occur.  
Based on these premises, the problem of disentangling between these two accounts can 
be turn into the question of verifying whether the mere knowledge about the co-actor’s 
task is sufficient to represent the alternative response, thus producing the Simon effect. 
A possible way to shed light on this question is to make the actor and the co-actor 
executing their own part of the task in different rooms. If knowing that another person is 
responding to the complementary color is sufficient to spatially code the alternative 
action associated to this color, the joint Simon effect should occur even when the co-
actor performs his/her part of the task in a different not-specified room. Conversely, if 
what allows participants to represent the alternative action is the fact that the co-actor 
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represents a salient spatially-connoted event, no Simon effect should be observed when 
the co-actor executes his/her task in a different not-specified room.  
Two recent studies (Tsai et al., 2008; Ruys & Aarts, 2010) seem to demonstrate that the 
mere belief of co-acting with another person is sufficient to induce the joint Simon 
effect. In these studies, indeed, the joint Simon effect was observed despite the actor 
and the co-actor performed the task in two different rooms (but see Welsh et al., 2007 
for contrasting results). However, some methodological concerns do not allow drawing 
firm conclusions about this question.  
In Tsai’s et al. (2008) study, participants sat alone in a room and were instructed to 
press the right button of a computer mouse when a lateralized green square appeared on 
the screen and to refrain from responding when a red square was presented. They were 
told that they would have performed the task with another individual, who was in 
another room and would have responded to the complementary color (the red square) by 
pressing the left button. A Simon effect was observed: Responses were faster when the 
target position corresponded to the participant’s response button (i.e., the target was on 
the right) than when it did not correspond (i.e., the target was on the left). In line with 
the action co-representation account, the Simon effect observed by Tsai et al. could be 
explained by assuming that the belief of co-acting with another individual responsible 
for the complementary color let participants to activate, not only the representation of 
the action they had to execute, but also the representation of the co-actor’s action. Yet, 
this effect could be traced back to spatial factors rather than to the knowledge about the 
co-actor’s task. That is, the representation of both left and right responses might have 
been prompted by the use of the mouse as response devise. It is well-known that, 
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although the Simon effect does not usually occur in individual Go/NoGo tasks in which 
only one response is mentioned (Callan et al. 1974), there are several exceptions to this 
rule: The Simon effect may occur when the experimental conditions lead participants, 
not only to activate the required response, but also to code another (non-active) 
response; for example, when the Go/NoGo task is preceded by a two-choice task in 
which participants used two response buttons (Ansorge & Wühr, 2009, 2004). The 
representation of a response, activated in the two-choice task, is transferred to the 
subsequent task, even though in the second task this response is no longer task relevant. 
Similarly, the practice in daily life with the left mouse button, which is more frequently 
used than the right one, could lead participants to activate, during the Go/NoGo task, the 
representation of the left button in addition to that of the right one (the required 
response button), thus inducing the Simon effect.  
Since in Tsai’s et al. (2008) study all participants responded to the Go stimuli by 
pressing the right mouse button, and given that participants never performed the 
Go/NoGo task individually, the occurrence of the Simon effect in their joint task cannot 
be unequivocally ascribed to the belief of co-acting with another person. 
A similar line of reasoning can account for the joint Simon effect observed by Ruys and 
Aarts (2010). In this study, participants performed an auditory version of the joint 
Simon task: They were instructed to respond to either high or low tones by pressing the 
right key (“3” on the numerical keyboard) and to withhold the response to the other 
tones because another person, who was in the adjacent room, would have responded to 
them by pressing the left button (“z”). A joint Simon effects was observed although the 
co-actor was acting in a different room: Participants were faster when the sound was 
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presented at the right ear than when it was presented at the left ear. However, the 
occurrence of the Simon effect can be justified by a minor detail of the experimental 
procedure: To online remind participants that another person was engaged in the task, 
the co-actor’s responses were signaled with a red light occurring on the left side of the 
screen, whereas participants’ responses were signaled with a red light occurring on the 
right side. The fact that the responses of both the participant and the co-actor were 
followed by the presentation of lateralized lights, spatially corresponding to their 
respective response buttons, might have allowed participants to code their own response 
as “right” as opposed to the left lights signaling the co-actor’s response. 
Thus, it remains open the question of whether the mere knowledge about the co-actor’s 
task is sufficient to give rise to the Simon effect. The present study addressed this issue. 
To this end, I decided to employ a paradigm similar to that used by Tsai and colleagues 
(2008): Participants sat alone in a room and were required to respond to the target 
stimuli by pressing one of the two buttons of a computer mouse. Although only one 
response was requested, the response device involved a possible alternative response 
(i.e. the press of the non-requested mouse button). This allowed me to manipulate the 
task instructions to compare two critical experimental conditions. In one of them, 
participants were explicitly required to code spatially the alternative response: They 
have to imagine responding to the alternative stimulus with the alternative response. In 
the other condition, participants were simply told that another person was responding to 
the alternative stimulus. 
In contrast to Tsai et al. (2008), I counterbalanced the response button position. That 
allowed me to test the hypothesis that different effects may be observed depending on 
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the mouse button participants have to press, which also provided further cues for the 
comprehension of the impact of previous experience on spatial effects observed in 
standard (individual) Simon tasks (Ansorge & Wühr, 2009, 2004).  
 
4.2 EXPERIMENT 4 
Experiment 1 aimed at disentangling between the two main hypotheses advanced to 
explain the joint Simon effect. To this end, participants were required to perform an 
individual Go/NoGo task first (i.e., baseline task), which requires them to press one of 
the two buttons of the mouse in response to stimuli of one color only. Afterwards, they 
executed a second task which was identical to the baseline task except for the 
instructions: an imaginative two-choice task or a joint task. In the imaginative two-
choice task, besides responding to the Go color, participants were also asked to imagine 
themselves responding to the NoGo color by pressing the alternative mouse button. In 
the joint task, participants continued to respond to the Go color but they also believed to 
perform the task with a co-actor, who was in a non-specified room and was responding 
to complementary (NoGo) color. Actually, participants performed the task on their own. 
Finally, to rule out possible practice effects a third group of participants was required to 
continue to perform the Go/NoGo task individually.  
Given that transfer effects from one task to another are very common in this kind of 
tasks (Ansorge & Wühr, 2004, 2009) I preferred not to counterbalance the order of the 
two tasks. Therefore, all participants started with the individual Go/NoGo task, enabling 
me to properly consider this individual task as a baseline.  
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The following predictions can be made. First of all, on the basis of the difference I have 
previously postulated between the two mouse buttons, I expect to observe a Simon 
effect in the baseline task, but only for participants who respond to the Go stimuli by 
pressing the right mouse button. No Simon effect should emerge for those participants 
using the left mouse button.  
In the imaginative two-choice task, which explicitly requires participants to activate the 
representation of the NoGo response, a Simon effect is expected, regardless of the 
response mouse button used to respond. In the joint task, different results are expected 
on the basis of the two main hypotheses advanced to explain the joint Simon effect. If 
the belief of co-acting with another person is sufficient to induce participants to 
spatially code the alternative response, as postulated by the action co-representation 
account, both right- and left-button participants should show a Simon effect in the joint 
task. Thus, participants engaged in the joint task should show the same pattern of results 
of those participants involved in the imaginative two-choice task. Conversely, inasmuch 
as the joint Simon effect depends on the fact that the co-actor’s response constitutes a 
salient action event, given that in our paradigm the co-actor is not-physically present, no 
Simon effect is expected.  
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4.2.1 Method 
4.2.1.1 Participants and experimental design 
Sixty-four undergraduate students of the University of Trento (9 males; aged 19 – 31 
years; all right-handed) participated in the experiment. All participants were naïve about 
the purpose of the experiment and they had a normal or correct-to-normal vision.  
Once recruited for the experiment they were randomly assigned to one of three 
experimental conditions (control, imaginative or social). Sixteen participants were  
 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Schematic representation of the experimental design adopted in Experiment 4. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions: control, imaginative or social. Each experimental 
condition comprised two tasks (i.e., the baseline individual task and the critical task). Participants assigned to 
the control condition, after completed the baseline, simply continued to perform the same Go/NoGo task 
individually. Participants assigned to the imaginative condition, once completed the baseline performed a task 
requiring them to imagine responding to the complementary color. In contrast, participants assigned to the social 
condition, after the baseline, were required to perform the same Go/NoGo task with an alleged co-actor who was 
in a non-specified room and was thought to respond to the complementary color. 
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assigned to either the control or the imaginative condition, whereas 32 participants were 
assigned to the social condition. Each condition comprised two tasks: the baseline and 
the critical tasks. Conditions were defined as control, imaginative or social depending 
on the task that participants would have performed after the baseline: the repetition of 
the individual Go/NoGo task, the imaginative two-choice task and the joint task, 
respectively (see Figure 4.1). 
 
4.2.1.2 Apparatus, stimuli and procedure 
All participants seated about 57 cm from a 17-inch monitor screen and performed two 
tasks, with a 5-min break in between.  
In all tasks, participants were instructed to press one of the two buttons of a computer 
mouse in response to stimuli of one color (Go color) and not to respond to stimuli of the 
other color (NoGo color). The mouse was aligned with the middle of the screen. Half of 
the participants responded with the left button, which was operated with the index 
finger of the right hand; the other half responded with the right button, which was 
operated with the middle finger of the right hand. The Go color and the response 
position were counterbalanced across participants and were kept constant in the two 
consecutive tasks. In the imaginative two-choice task, participants were also asked to 
imagine responding to the NoGo color, whereas in the joint task they believed that 
another person was responding to the NoGo color. Half of the participants were told that 
the co-actor was responding with their same button, whereas the other half were told 
that the co-actor was using the alternative button. 
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In all tasks, trials began with presentation of a central 0.8° × 0.8° white fixation cross, 
which remained visible for 500 ms. At the offset of fixation, the target stimulus (i.e., a 
1.9° × 1.9° colored square) was presented for 300 ms. The target was shown either on 
the left or on the right of the fixation (the centre of the target was horizontally aligned 
with fixation, 5.7° to the left or right) and it could be either green or red. Both the 
fixation point and target were presented on a black background. Offset of the target was 
followed by a blank of 500 ms. Thus, on the whole the time allowed for a response was 
800 ms. If the response was correct, the trial terminated with an additional 400-ms 
blank interval. In the case of an error (i.e., responses to the NoGo color, with the wrong 
button or with latencies in excess of 800 ms) a 200-ms visual error feedback (a string of 
six exclamation marks) was presented instead, followed by a 200-ms blank interval. 
In the joint task, to stress the participant’s feeling that another person was engaged, a 
click sound, randomly ranging from 240 to 622 ms, was delivered during the NoGo 
trials to signal the co-actor’s response. Participants were also instructed to press their 
response button to inform the alleged co-actor that they were ready to initiate the 
experiment or a new block of trials. Afterwards, a click sound and the presentation of an 
“ok” message on the screen signaled to the participant that the co-actor was ready to 
start as well. The computer delivered this reply after a random time interval.  
Each task consisted of 240 randomly mixed trials divided into two blocks. There were 
120 Go trials and 120 NoGo trials. In half of the Go trials, stimulus and response 
positions corresponded, whereas, in the other half, stimulus and response positions did 
not correspond. Experimental trials were preceded by 8 practice trials.  
 
87 
 
4.2.2 Results 
Error data (0.8%) were not analyzed. I first analyzed RTs for the baseline task. Correct 
mean RTs were submitted to an ANOVA with spatial correspondence (corresponding 
vs. noncorresponding) as within-subjects factor and two between-subjects factors: 
response button position (left- vs. right-button participants) and condition (imaginative 
vs. social vs. control). That allowed me to test the presence of differences between the 
three groups of participants in the baseline task. The analysis revealed a significant main 
effect of correspondence [F(1,58)=21.97, p<.001; p
2
=.28]. Participants were faster in 
corresponding than in noncorresponding trials (332 vs. 340 ms). Response position was 
also significant [F(1,58)=4,13, p<.05; p
2
=.07]: Left-button participants were faster than 
right-button participants (325 vs. 346 ms). More important, a significant Response 
position×Correspondence interaction was found [F(1,58)=10.94, p<01; p
2
=.16]. Post-
hoc analysis (Newman-Keuls) revealed that for right-button participants, responses were 
faster in corresponding than noncorresponding trials (340 vs. 353 ms, p<.001), whereas 
the two types of trials did not differ from each other for left-button participants (324 vs. 
326 ms, p=.56). Condition did not yield a significant effect and did not interact with any 
other factors [all Fs≤1.96, all ps≥.15; all p
2s≤.06].  
Next, I analyzed the baseline and the critical tasks of each condition (see Figure 4.2).  
Given the differences between left- and right-button participants observed in the 
baseline task, two separate ANOVAs were conducted for the two response positions. In  
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each ANOVA, there were two within-subjects factors: task (baseline vs. critical task) 
and correspondence (corresponding vs. noncorresponding). In the social condition, 
besides the two within-subjects factors, the co-actor’s response position (same- vs. 
alternative-button) was included in the analysis as between-subjects factor. This latter 
factor did not have a significant effect and did not interact with any other variable [all 
Fs≤2.00, all ps≥.18; all p
2s≤.08]. 
 
Figure 4.2. Means (± S.E.M.s) of correct RTs for each experimental condition in Experiment 4. For each 
condition, RTs are plotted as a function of response button position (left- vs. right-button participants), task 
(baseline vs. second task) and spatial correspondence (corresponding vs. noncorresponding trials). Asterisks 
indicate the presence of the Simon effect. 
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The main effect of task was significant in both imaginative and social conditions and for 
both left- and right-button participants (all Fs≥7.24; all ps<.05, all p
2s≥.34), whereas it 
was never significant in the control condition. In the imaginative condition, participants 
were slower in the imaginative two-choice than in the baseline task (388 vs. 318 ms and 
396 vs. 329 ms, for left and right-button participants, respectively). In the social 
condition, participants were faster in the joint than in the baseline task (314 vs. 333 ms 
and 325 vs. 348 ms, for left and right-button participants, respectively).  
Correspondence was significant in all experimental conditions for right-button 
participants [all Fs≥6.28, all ps<.05, all p
2s≥.31]: A Simon effect of 21-, 5-, and 11-ms 
was found in the imaginative, social and control conditions, respectively. In contrast, for 
left-button participants, Correspondence was significant only in the imaginative 
condition, in which a 18-ms Simon effect was found [F(1, 7)=12.62, p<.01; p
2
=.64].  
In the imaginative condition, the TaskCorrespondence interaction was significant only 
for left-button participants [F(1, 7)=14.84, p<.01; p
2
=.68]. These participants showed 
no Simon effect in the baseline task (p=.59), whereas they showed a 32-ms Simon effect 
in the imaginative two-choice task (p<.001). In contrast, for right-button participants, 
the interaction was not significant: The Simon effect was present in both tasks (19-ms 
and 23-ms in the baseline and in the imaginative two-choice, respectively).  
In the social condition, I found the opposite pattern of results. The 
TaskCorrespondence interaction was significant only for right-button participants [F(1, 
14)=4.61, p<.05; p
2
=.25]. For these participants, corresponding trials yielded faster 
responses than noncorresponding trials in the baseline task (343 vs. 353 ms; p<.001), 
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whereas there was no difference between corresponding and noncorresponding trials in 
the joint task (324 vs. 325 ms; p=.88). Conversely, for left-button responding 
participants, this interaction was not significant. The Simon effect was, indeed, absent 
in both tasks.  
In the control condition, the TaskCorrespondence interaction was never significant. 
Right-button participants exhibited an 11-ms Simon effect in both the baseline and the 
repetition of the individual Go/NoGo tasks, whereas left-button participants showed no 
effect in either tasks.  
 
4.2.3 Discussion 
The results observed in the baseline task of Experiment 4 showed that the Simon effect 
did not occur for left-button participants, suggesting that the task is appropriate to test 
whether the mere belief of co-acting with another person responding to the 
complementary color is sufficient to give rise to the Simon effect.  
In contrast, the Simon effect was shown by right-button participants. This finding 
demonstrates that these participants also represented the left button (hence, they 
represented both left and right responses), although it was task irrelevant and it was not 
mentioned in the instructions. These participants were also slower than left-button 
participants, who presumably represented only the required response, thus preventing 
any competition between responses to slow down RTs. These results are consistent with 
previous findings demonstrating the role of both contextual factors and previous 
experience (here, the massive practice with the left mouse button in daily life) in 
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determining the representation of two alternative responses in individual Go/NoGo 
tasks (Ansorge & Wühr, 2009, 2004). For this reason, the present finding represents an 
incremental contribution to the literature of the Go/NoGo Simon effect in showing that 
even a simple response device can induce participants to spatially code the alternative 
(non-requested) response, thus giving rise to the Simon effect (see also Dittrich et al., 
2012).  
More interestingly, participants’ performance was critically modulated by the kind of 
task executed after the baseline. Notably, the instructions associated to the imaginative 
two-choice and to joint tasks gave rise to opposite effects. First of all, they had a 
specific and differentially impact on participants’ RTs. Compared to the baseline task 
and regardless of the response button used to respond, RTs slowed down in the 
imaginative two-choice task, whereas the opposite trend occurred in the joint task. The 
significant increase of RTs in the imaginative two-choice task is consistent with 
previous findings showing that mentally performing an action is functionally similar to 
actually executing that action (e.g., Decety, & Grèzes, 2006; Decety, Jeannerod, & 
Prablanc, 1989). Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the imaginative two-choice task is 
functionally similar to the classical two-choice Simon task, in which the alternative 
response is effectively emitted
10
. This is further attested by the occurrence of the Simon 
effect in this task. Conversely, the significant reduction of RTs observed in the joint 
task is consistent with previous findings on the joint Simon effect (e.g., Sebanz et al., 
2003) and it is thought to be triggered by an increased arousal induced by social 
                                                          
10
 Another possible explanation, however, is that the instructions associated with the imaginative two-
choice task induced an extra-load on the working memory, making this task more demanding. 
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presence, which is typically the case on easy tasks (Guerin, 1993Aiello & Douthitt, 
2001).  
More importantly for the purpose of this study, the manipulations involved in the 
imaginative two-choice and in joint tasks, had an opposite influence on the size of the 
Simon effect. In the imaginative two-choice task, the explicit request of representing the 
alternative response made participants either to activate this representation (for left-
button participants) or to keep it active (for right-button participants), allowing the 
Simon effect to emerge even when it had not occurred in the baseline task. Left-button 
participants – who did not exhibit any effect in the baseline task – showed the Simon 
effect, whereas right-button participants continued to show the same effect emerged in 
the baseline task. In contrast, the belief of co-acting with an unseen co-actor was 
ineffective in eliciting the Simon effect. In the joint task, left-button participants 
continued to show no difference between the two correspondence conditions, whereas 
for right-button participants the effect disappeared. The absence of the joint Simon 
effect is at odds with the results observed by Tsai et al. (2008) and Ruys and Aarts 
(2010). Most importantly, this finding is inconsistent with the assumption – underlying 
the action co-representation account – that sharing a Simon task with a co-actor, 
responsible for the complementary color, leads participants to spatially code the 
alternative response (the co-actor’s action). Based on this account, indeed, the mere 
belief of co-acting with another individual, responsible for the complementary color, 
should have gave rise to Simon effect just like the explicit request to activate the 
representation of the alternative action. Instead, the absence of the joint Simon effect is 
in line with the referential coding account of the joint Simon effect in showing that the 
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mere belief of co-acting with another person and the mere knowledge about the co-
actor’s task are not sufficient to make participants representing the alternative action: 
When the co-actor in not physically present, the joint Simon effect does not show up.  
Finally, another important result deserves attention: The joint instructions made the 
Simon effect to disappear for those participants who showed it in the baseline task 
(right-button participants). This result is particularly interesting because, since transfer 
effects from one task to the other are very common (Ansorge & Wühr, 2009, 2004), one 
would have expected to still observe the Simon effect in the group of participants who 
performed the joint task with the right button. The disappearance of the Simon effect 
cannot be traced back to a practice effect, as demonstrated by the results observed in the 
control condition. Indeed, right-button participants continued to show the Simon effect 
in the repetition of the Go-NoGo task. Thus, the mere repetition of the task does not 
cause the disappearance of the effect: Both the two responses were kept active in the 
second task, even without the explicit request of activating the alternative response.  
The disappearance of the Simon effect may have been caused by a mere social 
facilitation effect (Huguet et al., 1999; Baron, 1986): The belief of co-acting with 
another individual might have induced participants to focus their attention on the 
relevant stimulus attribute (i.e., its color) and this might have reduced the interference 
effect of the irrelevant stimulus attribute (i.e., its position). If this were the case, the 
Simon effect should disappeared also when the co-actor is thought to respond to the 
same color of the participant. 
However, an alternative hypothesis could be advanced. The disappearance of the Simon 
effect in the joint task of the present study could have been induced by a division of 
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labor established between the participant and the co-actor, in like manner as task sharing 
made the semantic interference effect to disappear in Study 1.  
It is possible that, when performing the baseline task, right-button-responding 
participants may have associated the left response with the complementary color. In the 
joint task, however, due to the belief that the actor was responding to the 
complementary color, these participants may have attributed to the co-actor also this 
alternative response, regardless of the response button used by the co-actor. Given that 
these participants had no clue about the spatial position of the co-actor, it is possible 
that the response associated to the co-actor may have lost its spatial connotation. As a 
consequence, only one response remained active in the participants’ task 
representations, thus determining the disappearance of the Simon effect. If this were the 
case, than the Simon effect should persist both when the co-actor is thought to respond 
to the same color as the participant and when the co-actor is supposed to work on the 
complementary color but the participants know where the co-actor is. These 
possibilities were tested in Experiments 5 and 6, respectively.  
 
4.3 EXPERIMENT 5 
Experiment 5 aimed at excluding the possibility that the disappearance of the Simon 
effect observed in the joint task of Experiment 4 was simply due to a social facilitation 
effect. To this end, after completing the baseline task, participants executed a joint task 
identical to that of Experiment 4 except that they were told that the co-actor, who was in 
a non-specified room, was responding to their same Go color (i.e., joint task – same 
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target color assigned to the co- actor; e.g., both the participant and the co-actor 
responded to the green color; see Figure 4.3).  
 
 
 
The following predictions can be made. First of all, I expect to replicate the pattern of 
results observed in the baseline tasks of Experiment 4: Only right-button participants 
should show the Simon effect in the individual Go/NoGo (baseline) task, whereas left-
button participants should not any effect.  
In the joint task, since the co-actor is thought to respond to the same target color of the 
participant, the Simon effect is not expected to occur for left-button participants (see 
Lam & Chua, 2010). 
Importantly, for right-button participants a different pattern of results is expected on the 
basis of the social facilitation and the division-of-labor hypotheses. If the disappearance 
of the Simon effect observed in the joint task of Experiment 4 was due to a generic 
social facilitation effect, then the Simon effect should disappear also when the co-actor 
is thought to respond to the same target color of the participant. Indeed, according to the 
Figure 4.3. Schematic representation of the experimental design adopted in Experiment 5. After the baseline 
task, participants were required to perform the same Go/NoGo task with an alleged co-actor who was in a non-
specified room and was thought to respond to their same color. 
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social facilitation theories, knowing that another person is involved in the task should 
lead participants, regardless of the co-actor’s task, to focus their attention on the 
relevant stimulus information and to filter out the irrelevant stimulus information. In 
contrast, if in the joint task of Experiment 4 the Simon effect disappeared because the 
co-actor was responding to the complementary color, then the Simon effect should 
persist when the co-actor responds to the same target color of the participant. In this 
case, indeed, a division-of-labor cannot come into play. 
 
4.3.1 Method 
4.3.1.1 Participants 
Thirty-two undergraduate students of the University of Trento (5 males; aged 19 – 27 
years; all right-handed) participated in the experiment. All participants were not aware 
of the purpose of the experiment, they did not participate in the previous experiments 
and they had a normal or correct-to-normal vision. 
 
4.3.1.2 Apparatus, Stimuli and procedure 
The apparatus, stimuli and procedure were as in the social condition of Experiment 4 
with the following exceptions. After the baseline task, participants performed a joint 
task in which they believed that the co-actor was performing their same task (i.e., s/he 
was responding to their same Go stimuli). The click sound signaling the co-actor’s 
response was delivered at the end of the Go trials, 800 ms after Go stimulus 
presentation. Participants were told that the click sound did not correspond in time to the 
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co-actor’s response - given that it might have overlapped to their response - and that it 
was emitted only to inform them whether the co-actor had responded or not.  
 
4.3.2 Results and discussion 
Error data (0.5%) were not analyzed. Correct mean RTs of left- and right-button 
participants were submitted to two ANOVAs with the same factors of the social 
condition of Experiment 4. Again, the co-actor’s response position did not have any 
effects. 
Task was significant for both left and right-button participants [both Fs≥7.02, both 
ps<.05, both p
2s≥.33]. Consistently with the pattern of results observed in the social 
condition of Experiment 4, RTs were faster in the joint than in the baseline task (331 vs. 
340 ms and 321 vs. 340 ms, for left- and right-button participants, respectively). 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Means (± S.E.M.s) of correct RTs for right- and left-button responding participants in Experiment 
5. RTs are plotted as a function of task (baseline vs. joint task) and spatial correspondence (corresponding vs. 
noncorresponding trials), separately for the two response button positions (right- vs. left-button participants). 
Asterisks indicate the presence of the Simon effect.  
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Correspondence was significant only for right-button participants, [F(1, 14)=38.34, 
p<.001; p
2
=.73]: Responses were faster in corresponding than noncorresponding trials 
(324 vs. 337 ms). 
The TaskCorrespondence interaction was never significant (see Figure 4.4).  
Left-button participants exhibit the Simon effect neither in the baseline nor in the joint 
tasks: The difference between noncorresponding and corresponding trials was 3 and 4 
ms in the baseline and in the joint tasks, respectively. Conversely, right-button 
participants showed a Simon effect in both tasks: A corresponding trials advantage of 
13 and 14 ms was observed in the baseline and in the joint task, respectively.  
Consistently with the results observed in Experiment 4, only right-button participants 
showed the Simon effect in the baseline task of this experiment. Most importantly, the 
results of Experiment 5 demonstrate that when participants perform the joint task with 
another individual who is thought to respond to their same Go color, the belief of co-
acting with another individual has no influence on their performance: Participants 
behave as if they were still performing the Go/NoGo task individually. These results are 
inconsistent with the social facilitation hypothesis and support the division-of-labor 
account: When a division-of-labor is hampered, right-button participants do show a 
Simon effect in the joint task as well. This latter result suggests that for these 
participants the representation of the left mouse button, which automatically seems to 
occur in the baseline task, was still active during the joint task, being the 
complementary color not associated to any other person.  
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4.4 EXPERIMENT 6 
Experiment 6 aimed at verifying the hypothesis that the absence of any information 
about the position of the co-actor may have caused the alternative response to lose its 
spatial connotation after attributing it to the co-actor. To this end, after completing the 
baseline task, participants performed a joint task identical to that of Experiment 4: They 
were told that the co-actor was responding to the complementary color. However, in 
contrast with the joint task of Experiment 4, participants were also informed the co-
actor was acting in a room that was located on the opposite side relative to their 
response button (e.g., if the participant had to respond by pressing the left button, s/he 
was told that the co-actor was in the room on his/her left). The position of the room in 
which the co-actor was supposed to act coincided always with the position of the co-
actor’s response button (e.g., if the co-actor was acting in the room on the left, s/he was 
responding with the left mouse button; see Figure 4.5).  
 
 
Figure 4.5. Schematic representation of the experimental design adopted in Experiment 6. After the baseline 
task, participants were required to perform the same Go/NoGo task with an alleged co-actor who was thought to 
respond to the complementary color. Participants were also told that the co-actor was performing his/her part of 
the task in the room spatially opposed to their response position. The co-actor’s response button position 
corresponded always to the position of the room in which s/he was thought to act.  
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Consistently with Experiments 4 and 5, right-button participants should show the Simon 
effect in the baseline task, whereas left-button participants should not.  
Instead, the following predictions can be made for the joint task. If the information 
about the co-actor’s position is sufficient per se to determine the representation of the 
alternative response, left-button participants should show the Simon effect. Conversely, 
if this information is not sufficient, no effect is expected for these participants.  
For right-button participants I expect that the information about the co-actor’s position 
may allow the alternative response to keep its spatial connotation even after attributing 
it to another person. If this were the case, the Simon effect should persist in the joint 
task.  
 
4.4.1 Method 
4.4.1.1 Participants 
Sixteen undergraduate students of the University of Trento (all females; aged 19 – 24 
years; all right-handed) participated in the experiment. All participants were not aware 
of the purpose of the experiment, they did not participate in the previous experiments 
and they had a normal or correct-to-normal vision. 
 
4.4.1.2 Apparatus, Stimuli and procedure 
The apparatus, stimuli and procedure were as in the social condition of Experiment 4 
with the following exceptions. Participants were told that the co-actor was performing 
his/her part of the task in the room spatially opposed to their response button position. 
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Furthermore, the co-actor was thought to respond to the complementary color by 
pressing always the alternative mouse button (e.g., if the participant responded by 
pressing the right button, the co-actor was thought to use the left one). The co-actor’s 
response button position coincided with the position of the room in which s/he was 
supposed to act. 
 
4.4.2 Results and discussion 
Error data (0.1%) were not analyzed. Correct mean RTs of left- and right-button 
participants were submitted to two ANOVAs with two within-subjects factors: task 
(baseline vs. critical task) and correspondence (corresponding vs. noncorresponding). 
Task was significant for both left and right-button participants [both Fs≥6.95, both 
ps<.05, both p
2s≥.50]: RTs were faster in the joint than in the baseline task (312 vs. 
351 ms and 322 vs. 334 ms, for left- and right-button participants, respectively). 
Correspondence was significant only for right-button participants, [F(1, 7)=18.35, 
p<.005; p
2
=.72]: Responses were faster in corresponding than noncorresponding trials 
(322 vs. 334 ms).  
The TaskCorrespondence interaction was never significant (see Figure 4.6).  
The results of the baseline tasks of Experiment 6 replicate those observed in the baseline 
tasks of previous experiments described in the present study. The Simon effect occurred 
in this task only for right-button participants. Left-button participants did not show any 
effect.  
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In the joint task, left-button participants continued to show no effect. The absence of the 
Simon effect in the joint task of these participants extends the results observed in the 
joint tasks of Experiments 4 and 5: Besides confirming that the belief of co-acting with 
another person – responsible for the complementary color – is not sufficient to give rise 
to the Simon effect when the co-actor (i.e., the alternative action) in not physically 
present, it demonstrate that the information about the co-actor’s position is useless as 
well. Importantly for the purpose of this experiment, for right-button participants the 
Simon effect continued to be present in the joint task. This finding confirm the 
hypothesis that the disappearance of the Simon effect observed for these participants in 
the joint task of Experiment 4 was due to the fact that the assignment of the alternative 
response to another person without having any information about his/her position makes 
this response to lose its spatial connotation. Indeed, when participants know where the 
co-actor is, as happened in the joint task of this experiment, the Simon effect persists, 
Figure 4.6. Means (± S.E.M.s) of correct RTs for right- and left-button responding participants in Experiment 
6. RTs are plotted as a function of task (baseline vs. joint task) and spatial correspondence (corresponding vs. 
noncorresponding trials), separately for the two response button positions (right- vs. left-button participants). 
Asterisks indicate the presence of the Simon effect.  
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thus suggesting that the response associated to the complementary color (i.e., to the co-
actor’s task) remains active in the participants’ task representation. Furthermore, this 
finding suggests that the presence of the Simon effect in the joint task of Tsai’s et al. 
(2008) study is probably due to the fact that participants knew the position of the room 
in which the co-actor was acting.  
 
4.5 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The aim of the present study was to shed light on the mechanisms underlying the joint 
Simon effect by assessing whether sharing a Go/NoGo Simon task with another person 
responsible for the complementary color can induce the Simon effect even when the co-
actor perform his/her part of the task in a different room. The results of three 
experiments provide converging evidence showing that, when the co-actor is not 
physically present, the mere information about the co-actor’s task is not sufficient to 
allow participants representing the alternative response, thus to give rise to the Simon 
effect. Indeed, left-button participants showed this effect neither in the baseline nor in 
the joint task. This finding, besides failing to replicate earlier results by Tsai et al. 
(2008) and Ruys and Aarts (2010), supports the referential coding account of the joint 
Simon effect: When the co-actor is not physically present, the Simon effect does not 
show up. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the occurrence of the joint Simon effect 
in previous studies has been very likely due to the fact the co-actor per se may represent 
an alternative action, when acting next to the participant.  
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However, it must be said that the results of the present study are not completely at odds 
with the action co-representation account. I observed that knowing the co-actor’s task 
can have a specific impact on participants’ performance. In the social condition of 
Experiment 4, indeed, the belief of co-acting with another individual, who was 
responding to the complementary color, made the Simon effect to disappear for those 
participants who have shown it in the previous baseline task. As previously discussed, 
the occurrence of the Simon effect in this task is probably due to the fact that these 
participants represented the left button because of the familiarity with the mouse. 
Hence, task sharing caused the disappearance of the interference effect produced by the 
(incidental) spatial representation of an alternative response (the left response). To 
account for this finding, I proposed that, in the baseline task, right-button participants 
have associated the left response to the complementary color. Afterwards, since in the 
joint task the complementary color was up to the co-actor, participants have attributed to 
the co-actor also this response. However, as participants did not have any information 
about the co-actor’s position, the left response might have lost its spatial connotation, 
thus causing the disappearance of the Simon effect. 
This hypothesis was supported by the results of Experiments 5 and 6: Right-button 
participants continued to show the Simon effect in the joint task both when the co-actor 
was thought to respond to their same color (in Experiment 5) and when s/he was 
thought to respond to the complementary color but participants knew where the co-actor 
was (in Experiment 6). The presence of the Simon effect in the joint task of Experiment 
5 would demonstrate that when the co-actor is working on the same color of the 
participant, the alternative response remains active in participants’ task representation 
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just because it cannot be attributed to anyone else. Whereas the presence of the Simon 
effect in the joint task of Experiment 6 would demonstrate that even if the co-actor is 
working on the complementary color, the information about his/her position does not 
allow the alternative response to lose its spatial connotation.  
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5 
General discussion 
 
The aim of this thesis was to examine whether and to what extent performing a task 
with another person may change individual cognitive performance. As previously 
stated, interference paradigms are particularly suitable to address this issue, as they 
allow understanding how people can deal with the task irrelevant information when the 
accomplishment of a task is achieved in a joint and cooperative context.  
However, studies using different kinds of joint interference paradigms are not consistent 
in their results. Studies employing the joint version of Simon-like paradigms provided 
evidence showing that, in joint tasks, participants represent the co-actor’s task to such 
an extent that performance is affected as if they were performing the partner’s task as 
well (Atmaca et al., 2011, 2008; Sebanz et al., 2003). This leads participants to show 
interference effects that do not usually occur when they perform the same task without 
the co-actor. Yet, the fact that an interference effect unavoidably occurs whenever two 
individuals work together on the same task was brought into question by a recent study 
(Heed et al., 2010) showing that in joint tasks participants can ignore the co-actor task. 
This leads to a facilitation effect instead of producing (or increasing) interference.  
After examining the peculiarities of the joint paradigms, I proposed that the different 
nature of these tasks can account for the contrasting results. In particular, I hypothesized 
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that interference effects can occur when the actor and the co-actor perform two 
complementary tasks, working on two different values of the same stimulus; on the 
contrary a facilitation effect (i.e., a reduction of interference) is expected when they 
have to execute simultaneously two independent tasks on two different stimuli. The 
rationale behind this hypothesis was the following: If the co-actor works simultaneously 
on the stimuli that cause interference, task sharing could lead the participant to ignore 
these stimuli, thus leading to a reduction of the interference effect. Conversely, when 
two participants work on two different values of the same target stimulus, not only the 
complementary value cannot be easily ignored but it is also very likely that the 
alternative response associated to it can be activated, thus leading to interference 
produced by the activation of the two alternative responses.  
In Study 1 (Experiments 1, 2 and 3) I tested this hypothesis by having participants 
perform the PWI paradigm (Rosinski et al., 1975), which requires to name a picture 
while ignoring a distractor word, both individually (baseline task) and co-acting with an 
alleged partner (joint task). The results of this study confirmed my hypothesis. Results 
showed that, compared to the baseline task and to a control condition in which 
participants continued to perform the PWI individually, the belief of co-acting with 
another individual suppressed the semantic interference effect when the co-actor was 
thought to be in charge of the distractor stimuli. To account for this finding I proposed 
that the belief that another person was working on the distractor stimuli allowed 
participants to succeed in ignoring these stimuli, thus preventing the semantic 
interference effect to occur.  
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The social manipulation, however, was effective only when written word recognition 
was delayed or impaired by case alternation (Experiments 2 and 3). In Experiment 1, in 
which distractor stimuli were shown in upper case letters, written word recognition is so 
mandatory that participants fail to ignore the distractor stimuli.  
The results of Experiments 3 further supports the hypothesis that the disappearance of 
the semantic interference effect is strictly related to the fact that the co-actor is thought 
to work on a different stimulus. Indeed, sharing a PWI paradigm with a co-actor 
working on the same stimuli as the participant (i.e., both the participant and the co-actor 
responded to the picture) did not eliminate the semantic interference effect.  
Overall, the results of Study 1 seem to confirm that the occurrence of interference or 
facilitation effects in joint paradigms depends on the nature of task distributed between 
two participants: Interference effects occur when the actor and the co-actor work on 
different values of the same target stimulus, whereas facilitation effects occur when the 
two participants are in charge of different stimuli. 
In Study 2 (Experiments 4, 5 and 6) I employed the Go/NoGo version of the Simon task 
(Simon & Small, 1969) to assess whether the occurrence of the interference effect in 
joint Simon tasks (Sebanz et al., 2003) really reflects the representation of the co-actor’s 
task. To this end, in Experiment 4 participants performed a Go/NoGo Simon task first 
individually (baseline), and then either imaging themselves responding to the NoGo 
stimuli (imaginative two-choice task) or co-acting with another person who was in a 
non-specified room and was thought to respond to the complementary color (joint task). 
The rationale behind this experimental design was the following. If the information 
about the co-actor’s task is sufficient to allow participants activating the representation 
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of the alternative response associated to the complementary color, participants engaged 
in the imaginative two-choice and in the joint tasks should show the same pattern of 
results: The Simon effect for both groups as compared to the baseline task.  
Yet, the results contradicted this expectation. Compared to the baseline task and to a 
control condition in which participants continued to perform the Go/NoGo Simon task 
individually, while the instructions associated to the imaginative two-choice task made 
the Simon effect to occur, those associated to the joint task were ineffective in eliciting 
the Simon effect. The absence of the Simon effect in the joint task supports the 
referential coding account of the joint Simon effect (Dolk et al., 2013) in showing that 
when the co-actor is non-physically present, the alternative response is not represented. 
This finding is at odds with the assumption – underlying the action co-representation 
account (Sebanz et al., 2006) – that knowing that the co-actor is performing the 
complementary task leads participants to activate the alternative response associated to 
this task.  
Besides that, the results of Experiment 4 demonstrated that the belief to perform the task 
with another person in charge of the complementary task made the Simon effect to 
disappear for those participants who have shown it in the previous baseline task. To 
account for this result I proposed that the belief that someone else was taking care of the 
NoGo stimuli allows participants to attribute to the co-actor also the alternative 
response that they have previously associated to these stimuli. However, given that no 
information about the co-actor’s position was provided to the participants, this response 
lost its spatial connotation. This hypothesis was supported by the results of Experiments 
5 and 6: In the joint task, the Simon effect continued to be present in the joint task both 
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when the co-actor was thought to perform the same task as the participants (i.e., both 
the participant and the co-actor responded to the same color; in Experiment 5) and when 
participants knew where the co-actor was even if, as in Experiment 4, s/he was thought 
to respond to the complementary color (in Experiment 6). The persistence of the Simon 
effect in the joint task of Experiment 5 is consistent with the hypothesis that when the 
co-actor works on the same stimuli as the participant, the alternative response cannot be 
attributed to anyone else and, consequently, it remains active in participants’ task 
representation. Whereas the persistence of the Simon effect in the joint task of 
Experiment 6 supports the hypothesis that when the spatial information about the co-
actor’s position is provided, this information makes the alternative response to keep its 
spatial connotation even after attributing it to another person.  
On the whole, the results of Study 2 contribute to the debate on the mechanisms 
underlying the joint Simon effect by providing further evidence supporting the 
referential coding account of this effect. Furthermore, the results of this study are 
consistent with the action co-representation account in showing that the information 
about the co-actor’s task can influence participants’ performance. 
Importantly, the results of Study 2 extend the findings of Study 1 to the conditions in 
which the actor and the co-actor work on two complementary values of the same 
stimulus. Indeed, in both studies and regardless of the paradigm used, I observed that 
task sharing can determine the disappearance of the interference effect produced by the 
task irrelevant information (Study 1) or by the (incidental) spatial representation of an 
alternative response (Study 2). The disappearance of the interference effects, however, 
occurs only when the co-actor was thought to work on different or complementary 
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stimuli but not when s/he was in charge of the same stimuli as the participant. This 
allows ruling out the hypothesis that the suppression of the interference is due to a 
generic social facilitation effect induced simply by the involvement of another 
individual (cf. Huguet et al., 1999). Instead, the disappearance of the semantic 
interference effect as well as of the Simon effect seems to be triggered by the 
implementation of a division-of-labor strategy between the actor and the co-actor, which 
is an important component of social interactions. Indeed, “for shared representations of 
actions and tasks to foster coordination rather than create confusion, it is important that 
agents also be able to keep apart representations of their own and of others’ actions and 
intentions. Unless it is clear who is doing (or preparing to do) what, coagents cannot 
efficiently plan their next moves” (Pacherie, 2011, p. 359).  
Finally, the results of both studies, besides demonstrating that the mere belief of co-
acting with another person is sufficient to modulate interference effects, converge in 
showing that task sharing can be effective in suppressing the interference effects only 
under certain circumstances. Task sharing can eliminate the semantic interference effect 
only when written word recognition is made more difficult; whereas the Simon 
interference effect can be suppressed only when participants are not informed about the 
position of the co-actor. 
To conclude, recent studies demonstrated that it is possible to eliminate well-known 
interference effects by hypnotizing participants to make them ignoring the task 
irrelevant information (Lifshitz, Aubert-Bonn, Fischer, Kashem, Raz, 2013; Raz & 
Campbell, 2011; Iani, Ricci, Gherri, & Rubichi, 2006; Raz, Kirsch, Pollard, & Nitkin-
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Kaner, 2006; but see Augustinova & Ferrand, 2012). The results of this thesis proved 
that this expensive and complex procedure is absolutely not necessary.  
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